WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is Flawed and Must Be Fixed by Ragosta, John et al.
WTO Dispute Settlement: the System is Flawed
and Must Be Fixed*
JOHN RAGOSTA, NAVIN JONEJA, AND MIKHAIL ZELDOVICH**
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), arising from the Uruguay Round negotiations, is generally considered to be the
"crown jewel" of the WTO trading system. As Professor Raj Bhala notes, the literature on
the subject has been "characterized by a near irrational exuberance-pace Alan Green-
span-about the new adjudicatory system.", An indication of the importance and respect
assigned to the DSU and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is the moniker of "world
trade court" used to describe its function.2
In theory, the DSU should provide a forum where aggrieved WTO Members can en-
courage noncompliant nations to live up to the substantive commitments made in the ne-
gotiated agreements. The binding nature of dispute settlement under the DSU should serve
notice to Member nations that they must abide by the agreed-upon terms or face possible
sanctions. Many have noted that the binding nature of the DSU can provide political cover
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1. Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 Am,. U. INT'L
L. REV. 845, 856 (1999). Bhala goes on to give examples of some of the most flattering descriptions, including
"the core 'linchpin' of the whole trading system," a "major success story," and "indicative of the triumph of
legalism over power politics." Id. at 856-57 (quoting various sources) (footnotes omitted).
2. See discussion in John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO-Access to the DSB System: Can the W7O DSB
Live Up to the Moniker "World Trade Court"? 31 LAW & PoL'Y IN-r'L Bus. 739 (2000).
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for executives forced to make unpopular choices on trade issues.' In sum, forced compliance
via binding dispute settlement should, theoretically, ensure that each country receive all the
benefits for which it negotiated, and that no country is required to make concessions to
which it has not agreed and which have not been "paid for."
Yet, this idyllic picture of the DSU hides serious flaws in the system's structure and has,
regrettably, been shattered by experience. The earlier identified risk that the DSB might
adopt judicial activism and abuse its binding nature to create WTO "common law," to
which the Members never agreed, 4 has been realized in a series of decisions. Litigation over
how negotiated agreements should be interpreted has led in many instances not to Members
getting the "benefit of the bargain," but to exactly the opposite. Provisions for which Mem-
bers specifically negotiated have been cast aside or ignored by WTO panels in favor of
other more ambiguous (or what panelists may view as ambitious) interpretations. As a result,
the DSB has become not simply an enforcer of negotiated agreements, but an international
tribunal that, in violation of specific provisions and sound concepts of international law
development, creates new obligations and imposes them on sovereign nations, obligations
to which those nations never agreed.
American lawyers unfamiliar with international law may object because courts commonly
"make law," although even in the domestic setting this can be highly controversial. But
there are fundamental problems with the DSB doing so: First, in international law there
are sound reasons why panels should not (and cannot) create obligations to which the parties
did not agree. Among other concerns, there is no functioning international governing sys-
tem to control such law-giving "courts" through "democratic" means of amending of laws,
reversal of inappropriate decisions, fair appointment of judges, etc.' In U.S. constitutional
terms, there are no effective checks and balances. In such a system, "judges" truly become
"Platonic guardians."6 Second, this danger is seriously enhanced by the often-ambiguous
3. For example, as Dean Michael Young explains:
Proponents of the more adjudicatory approach also argue that more rigorous and effective enforcement
of GATT rules will help stave off protectionist pressures in various countries.... Some commentators
believe that a more legalistic approach to GATT dispute resolution might even help reduce pressure
within the EU for more protectionist measures now that parties within the EU are entitled to rely on
the GATT in bringing complaints before the EU.
Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 1Ir'L LAW.
389, 390-91 (1995).
4. Alan Vm. Wolff & John A. Ragosta, How the Uruguay Round Will Change the Practice of International
Trade Law in the United States, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR
THE 2 IST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 697, 698 (Terrence P. Stewart ed. 1996).
5. Ragosta, supra note 2, at 741; Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI J. INT'LL. 401 (2000).
Can one seriously argue, for example, that the members of the European Community (EC) would accept the
authority of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) without the protections of the EC Parliament and the
Community bureaucracy and executive functions which can effectively control undue "activism" by the ECJ?
6. Some commentators have somehow twisted such DSB authority to change or avoid domestic legislative
pressures or the political realities of negotiations as "pro-democratic." This is Orwellian (of the order of white
is black, black is white, the WTO DSB is democracy enhancing ... ). See Raustiala, supra note 5 (responding
to John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, I CH. J. INT'L L. 381 (2000)). Apparently
the theory goes that the WTO DSB will be able to protect "the people's" interest in free trade and consumer
welfare when their own governments cannot do so domestically or in international negotiations and, thus, the
system is democratic. As a preliminary matter, the assumption that trade protection in response to unfair trade
is anti-consumer and, thus, also anti-democratic is flawed at several levels. In terms of the anti-consumer issue,
Professor John Jackson has noted, for example, that countervailing duty law has contributed to a reduction in
VOL. 37, NO. 3
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 699
nature of the WTO's substantive commitments.7 Such ambiguity, while a diplomatic ne-
cessity to obtain the consensus necessary for agreement, and the normal means of growth
and development of international law, creates a very broad field on which activist judges
might play. Third, because the WTO DSU has essentially evolved from the previous "dip-
lomatic" GATT model of dispute settlement, it does not contain the procedural protections
that are essential to due process, equity, and transparency in a binding judicial environment.8
These crucial flaws in the DSU's design have manifested themselves in a number of
failures. Panels have often simply constructed obligations where the Parties created none.
This puts Members in an untenable position as they try to decide whether, in new nego-
tiations, to insist on the provisions they have already negotiated for and achieved, to abuse
the system by seeking to use dispute settlement to impose obligations on other parties to
which those parties did not agree (consider that the EC's FSC and privatization claims
against the United States reportedly, at least in part, were a response to the perceived
"abuse" in U.S. claims on bananas and beef hormones), and/or to diminish the relevance
of W'TO dispute settlement. Judicial activism also undermines faith in the system and
threatens support for additional liberalization.9
subsidies that reduce world wealth. John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Countervailing Duties, 21 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 739, 742-43 (1990). Further, those that claim the '.VTO is democracy enhancing implicitly assume
that wealth maximization of consumers is the only interest in a democratic society. Yet, as Raustiala points out,
there are many other compelling "democratic" interests in the area of the environment and labor. We might
add there are other interests in the area of production and fairness. See, e.g., John A. Ragosta, Natural Resource
Subsidies and the Free Trade Agreement: Economic Justice and the Need for Subsidy Discipline, 24 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & EcoN. 255 (1991) (discussing the right of workers to be free of foreign government unfair trade
practices). (In fact, if welfare, read wealth, of the people was all that was at issue, one could also point out that
there is such a thing as an "optimal tariff." See, e.g., MODEcosi E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics: A
POLICY APPROACH 302 (1979)). Raustiala suggests that the only interest consistently served by binding inter-
national dispute settlement at the expense of domestic democracy is the profitability and flexibility of multi-
national firms. See Raustiala, supra note 5, at 415. In the end, one might as well argue that maintaining King
George's platonic guardianship of the American colonies was more "democratic" than the ugly specter of
legislatures grappling with constituent interest.
7. Professor Hudec, in discussing the problems with GATT 1947 dispute settlement, noted that it's "bad
reputation was not entirely deserved, however, for the root problem in all these cases was that the underlying
law being applied was seriously defective." Thus, as to the source of the problems, "most important of all, is
the law itself. GATT law is full of gaps, omissions, inconsistencies and outmoded provisions." Robert Hudec,
The Judicialization of GA TT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 16, 23 (Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Steger eds., 1992). See also Volff & Ragosta, supra
note 4, at 702.
8. As one trade scholar noted in 1995: "[Ilmportant issues regarding dispute resolution remain
unresolved. . . . The procedural rules governing the panel, arbitration, and appellate body proceedings...
receive only passing attention in the Understanding or, for that matter, in any other formal GATT document."
Young, supra note 3, at 406.
9. An excellent article analyzing the judicial activism of X\,TO panels and its potential effect on Members'
support for trade liberalization is Daniel K. Tarnllo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO
Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 109, 172 (2002). Tarullo engages in an
extended discussion of the serious costs of such judicial activism in which he warns that the Appellate Body
(AB), by "disregarding" the negotiated standard of review in antidumping cases
has effectively revised the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement. If the United States still wants
the protection for its anti-dumping law administration that it thought it was getting in 1995, it will
have to negotiate again for protections in the new round of negotiations.... It looks, then, as if the
United States must "pay" twice to obtain discretion to choose among "permissible" legal interpreta-
tions of its international obligations.
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In short, the DSU is flawed, it has failed, and it needs to be fixed. Part I of this paper
discusses the shortcomings inherent in a binding dispute resolution system lacking in fun-
damental democratic oversight in the context of ambiguous international agreements. 10 Part
II discusses some of the failures that this system has produced. Part III details the DSU's
procedural deficiencies, and Part IV offers suggestions for reform.
I. The WTO Dispute Settlement Process is Conceptually
and Institutionally Flawed
The very nature of the WTO Agreements makes the prospect of binding dispute reso-
lution very dubious. Most of the negotiated provisions themselves are unclear, which leaves
an arbitrator with two choices: simply to dismiss cases as being beyond the purview of
WVTO norms, or to create some obligation where none existed before. If the agreements
were clearly defined, panels could simply determine the facts and apply the negotiated
provision appropriately. But when different parties to an agreement have differences of
opinion about the meaning of a negotiated provision (much of it intentional, resulting from
an inability to reach more precise agreement in the Uruguay Round negotiations), judicial
interpretation or "construction" becomes almost inevitable." Professor Raustiala has de-
scribed this as the problem of "generativity," that is, that dispute settlement is likely to
generate new, or at least evolved, legal interpretations. 2
... Having seen the AB nullify a provision that was supposed to protect national prerogatives, the
United States may conclude that the "costs" of negotiating further restrictions on the use of its trade
laws will increase as the WTO dispute settlement system consistently decides cases against the im-
porting nation....
Note the relationship between AB practice and the potential for sub-optimal trade negotiations. By
significantly "changing" the rules from what the United States expected it had negotiated, the AB has
denied WTO members the ability to specify obligations in the way that maximizes the benefits each
can obtain.
Suppose now that the AB's disregard of 17.6(ii) is read as part of a broader effort by the AB to establish
the WTO as a potent constitutional regime. In that circumstance, the inhibitions upon negotiating
new agreements may spread beyond the area of trade remedies.
Tarullo, supra.
10. The suggestion that this is an issue of a litigative versus a negotiation model can be somewhat simplistic.
For example, as Professor Hudec has observed, GATT 1947 dispute settlement was more litigative than some
would suggest. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three
Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4 (1999). Equally, as discussed further in Part III, to portray the current
system as completely litigative is misleading. See also Ragosta, supra note 2.
11. One commentator explains this as the difference between "standards" and "rules":
Where the applicable legal provision has the characteristics of a rule-clear, self-executing, fully spec-
ified in advance ... once the facts are determined, the dispute resolution process has little more to do.
Where, alternatively, the legal provision has the characteristics of a standard, with need of interpre-
tation or even construction, then the determination of the law and the application of the law to the
facts become much more complex.
Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 337-38 (1999). Trachtman
goes on to note an important distinction for these purposes: "Another distinction between rules and standards,
often de-emphasized in this literature, is the institutional distinction: with rules, the legislature often "makes"
the decision; with standards, the adjudicator determines the application of the standard, thereby "making" the
decision." Id. at 353. For these purposes, the Member States are the "legislature," panelists the adjudicators.
12. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 412. Domestically, of course, the same problem arises. For example, some of
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Some commentators protest that the DSB is explicitly prevented by the text of the VTO
Agreements from creating substantive obligations for Members.i 3 But the protests, and the
limitation in the DSU, are simply in vain. Unless panels refuse to answer when the "law"
is unclear-which would be the appropriate response as a matter of international law, but
requiring extraordinary restraint on the part of panelists-then "law making" is inevitable.
As discussed in Part II below, the cases demonstrate that law is clearly being made.
Of course, such judicial construction and the accretion of "judge-made law" is common-
place in a domestic context, 14 and is a problem that can be relatively easily kept in check
through checks and balances: legislative oversight and amendment, democratic processes
for appointment of judges, impeachment in extreme circumstances, etc. Indeed, the mere
existence of legislative oversight likely does much to constrain judges within a broad range
of reasonable decisions. Yet, in an international context, and particularly in the WATO, the
problem becomes much more serious for three reasons.
the Supreme Court's most controversial decisions surround "penumbral" rights, that is, areas of what Raustiala
would call "generativity" but, as explained below, in the case of domestic courts, there are ultimately democratic
controls to prevent or correct judicial abuses.
13. Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides: "Recommendations and rulings
of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." Un-
derstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTs-REsULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 114, 115 [hereinafter DSU].
14. "[Jjudicial law-making is a permanent feature of administration of justice in every society ... " Tracht-
man, supra note 11, at 333 (quoting HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 155 (1982)). Yet, it is well to remember that even in a domestic context the development
of "judge-made" law has not been without controversy. For example, in the time of Jackson, Democrats
complained bitterly of the undemocratic nature of such lawgiving:
As Robert Rantoul pointed out, the common law "indefinitely and vaguely settled, and its exact limits
unknown," gave far too much scope to the discretion of judges. Theophilus Fisk added harshly that
the common law, "based upon deception, extortion, villainy and fraud," was "one of the most potent
of all engines in the hand of an air bubble aristocracy, to rob the many to benefit the few." Even a
Whig like Richard Hildreth, much influenced by Bentham, was moved to describe it as "directly hostile
to the spirit of democracy." It should not so much be regarded as a system for the administration of
justice, he said, "as a contrivance for setting aside the laws .... and those intentions fail to meet the
approbation of the judges." "Under an enlightened democratical government," he concluded, "it is
entirely out of place-becoming, in fact, a contrivance to enable the few to defeat the wishes of the
many.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE oFJACiSON 330 (1945) (footnote omitted). Teddy Roosevelt also warned
against judicial activism:
[Flor the courts to arrogate to themselves functions which properly belong to the legislative bodies is
all wrong, and in the end works mischief. People should not be permitted to pardon evil and slipshod
legislation on the theory that the court will set it right; they should be taught that the right way to get
rid of a bad law is to have a legislature repeal it, and not to have the courts by ingenious hair-splitting
nullify it ... Under a popular government such as ours, founded on the theory that in the long run
the will of the people is supreme, the ultimate safeguard of the nation can only rest in training and
guiding the people so that what they will shall be right, and not in devising means to defeat their will
by the technicalities of strained construction.
43 CONG. REC. 16, 21 (Dec. 8, 1908) (President's Annual Message to Congress), quoted in MALCOLM R. WILKEY,
IS IT TIME FOR A SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION? 43 (1995).
Of course, as explained below, the dangers of judicial activism are far greater in an international context than
in the domestic context.
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First, judicial interpretation raises far less serious concerns when considering a problem-
atic term in an otherwise clear text (e.g., the meaning of "equality" within the context of
an agreed-upon provision). Yet, the terms of the WTO codes are hardly clear and unam-
biguous.11 Granted, domestic statutory terms can also be riddled with ambiguities, but can
anyone seriously suggest that domestic statutes are generally as ambiguous in their terms
as the WTO codes?
In fact, even when domestic statutes are ambiguous, domestic courts can approach the
problem with a high degree of shared values, shared means of interpretation (e.g., respect
for legislative history), and shared learning which, while all of the litigants cannot be ex-
pected to agree completely, will generally be within the bounds of reasonable expectations.
By comparison, the fundamental shared vision or expectations about the purpose or intent
of a code in the international context are likely to diverge dramatically from developed to
less developed nations, or from western to non-western nations.16 For example, the United
States saw the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and anti-
dumping (AD) agreements as means to discipline trade distorting subsidies and dumping;
much of the rest of the world saw them as a means to discipline countervailing duties (CVD)
and AD remedies.
Perhaps no better example of the problem of inconsistent understandings of the funda-
mental scope and requirements of a text can be provided than in the area of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). It is fair to say there was
15. Worries about the vagueness of these international agreements, among other things, was one of the
prime reasons that some countries initially opposed binding dispute settlement in the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations: "[H]ighlighting the ambiguity of GATT rules, the political sensitivity of trade disputes, and the
complex trade-offs of competing interests that go into the formulation of any trade rule [some countries] have
argued that GATT dispute resolution should not be particularly formal, legal, or adjudicatory." Young, supra
note 3, at 390. Initially, it was the EU and Japan, in particular, that opposed binding dispute settlement with
these concerns in mind. See CLAuDt E. BARFIELD, FiEE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMociAcv 22-23 (2001).
16. Trachtman makes a similar point when he notes, "From a lawyer's perspective, perhaps the most salient
difference between the international legal context and the domestic legal context ... is the relative thickness
of the domestic legal context. This thick domestic legal context is highly articulated and supplies a reliable and
predictable mechanism to complete contracts." Trachtman, supra note 11, at 347.
In the context of the WTO and trade remedies, the differences are particularly sharp. There are countries
that are deeply concerned about protecting their relatively open domestic market from unfair trade (e.g., the
United States) and countries concerned primarily with access to large foreign markets regardless of unfair trade.
There are countries that have a long and respected history of substantial government involvement in the
economy and subsidization (e.g., the EC, Canada, Mexico, Brazil), and countries that are more concerned with
stopping the entry of subsidized goods (e.g., the United States; while it certainly provides subsidies, particularly
in the area of agriculture, a number of studies have shown that it does so far less than many of its major trading
partners). There are countries that function in a highly open and transparent system of trade regulation (e.g.,
the United States and Canada) and those that have highly opaque systems that provide alternative means of
protection that may avoid some WTO scrutiny (e.g., Korea, Japan, and the EC).
There is an even more fundamental difference in countries' expectation of the proper role and independence
of the judiciary, not to mention means of judicial interpretation. Former D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Malcolm
Wilkey discussed this problem between even relatively similar democratic nations (Canada, the United States,
and Mexico) in the context of FTA/NAFTA chapter 19 dispute settlement. See In Re Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01-USA, slip op. at 59-64 (U.S.-Canada FTA Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Comm. Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
We recognize, of course, that there is far from complete homogeneity of .iew among citizens of any country,
certainly not in the United States. Nonetheless, as a relative matter we submit that the observation holds true.
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simply not a detailed consensus on the meaning of all of the terms,"' and a panel decision
that sought to reach a definitive position on many of the TRIPs issues would be "making
law" rather than reporting on it. The appropriateness of the precautionary principle in the
area of phytosanitary requirements is another example, but these are hardly unique.
Second, this interpretative problem, the generation of "common law," is greatly exacer-
bated by the character of the international regime and, in particular, the WTO regime.
International law can develop effectively only with the consent of the nation states that
participate. The late Professor Richard Lillich would explain patiently and repeatedly to
his young law students that, "international law is, and it is only, what the community of
nations agrees it to be."'" In terms of sovereign authority, the United States need not (and
should not) give up, for example, its protection against unfair trade practices unless it agrees
to do so, regardless of what the rest of the world says. Nor should India give up its right
to impose compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals unless it does so knowingly, intentionally,
and based on a balance of concessions. 
9
Some dismiss such concerns as limited to jurisprudes, but these issues are fundamental
to democratic institutions. When a domestic court "makes law," it is subject to review by
the legislature, oversight, and modification. It is subject to clear and binding limitations
(not just laws, but overarching restraints, e.g., the Bill of Rights). In extreme circumstances,
the decision can be reversed by the legislature (judges can even be impeached). A function-
ing system of appeals of both facts and law exists. More often than not, the prospect of such
oversight itself limits the flexibility with which a judge might seek to impose his or her own
views. Such protections are essential parts of a democratic system. Without them, judges
become Platonic guardians. Yet, these fundamental democratic controls are lacking, or cer-
tainly ineffective, in the WVTO.
It is true that WTO Members could revise or interpret the rules, should they decide that
a panel had gone too far.20 Yet, WTO mechanisms for amending or interpreting new rules
are inefficient and virtually impossible to utilize effectively, thus lacking the capacity to
"rein in" activist panels.' Certainly, given Members' differences of interests, losses in
17. See, e.g., Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, VWT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 1 6 (Nov.
14, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/min0l-e/mindecl-trips-e.pdf, in which
Members felt it necessary to clarify appropriate use of compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals.
18. Author's recollections.
19. See Tarullo, supra note 9. These limitations grow directly out of the nature of sovereignty. See, e.g., E.
DE VAT EL, THE LAW OF NATIONS Xi (1796):
According to [Wolfius] the Voluntary Law of Nations would resemble the civil law of [a] grand Republic.
This idea does not satisfy me; I do not find the fiction of such a republic, either very just, or solid
enough to deduce the rule of Law of Nations universally and necessarily admitted among foreign
states. . . . It is essential to all civil society (Civitatis) that each member has given up his right to the
body of society, and that it has an authority of commanding all the members, of giving them laws, and
of constraining those who refuse to obey. Nothing like this can be conceived or supposed to subsist
between nations. Each sovereign state pretends to be, and actually is, independent of all others.
20. Trachtman suggests that these mechanisms protect "democratic" interests of members.
[T]he representatives of member states continue to have substantial power over the dispute resolution
process. One avenue of influence is the ability to establish new treaties or treaty provisions. . . . A
second avenue of influence is through the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of XVTO agree-
ments. A third is to specify the "standard of review."
Trachtman, supra note 11, at 345 (footnote omitted). While interesting in theory, as explained below, the first
two are impractical and the third has failed.
21. Claude Barfield of the American Enterprise Institute sums this problem up as follows:
Only the Ministerial Conference or the General Council can enact clarifications or interpretations of
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dispute settlement of particular concern to developed countries (or countries with relatively
open markets) may not be subject to remedy, even though it is evident that the "rule"
adopted by a panel is one that could have never received consensus in negotiations in the
first place. No wonder that there has not been a single successful attempt to revise or re-
interpret any WTO rules.
Nor are the major revisions to W'TO rules that result from exhaustive rounds of multi-
lateral negotiations a good or timely mechanism for restraining judicial activism. In terms
of correcting errant panels, at best, such negotiations force nations to "pay twice" for what
they had already bargained for (or bargained not to give up). Furthermore, a new "obli-
gation" imposed by dispute settlement panels may simply not be able to be reversed.
Thus, the WTO DSB is insulated from oversight, preventing the correction of"errors"
and contributing directly to the willingness of panelists to "freestyle" decisions to fit their




This is, in part, the "sovereignty" issue that has been batted about so freely and often
without careful consideration. In international law, these factors have traditionally dictated
that in any form of dispute settlement nations be held only to that which they have definitely
agreed. "[T]he view prevailing among writers is that there is no room for non liquet in
international adjudication because there are no lacunae in international law." 21 This per-
spective is important in light of the Lotus doctrine that the principle of sovereignty requires
that what is not positively prohibited to states is permitted to them.2 4 In other contexts, the
sovereign nature of negotiation participants, and the unwillingness of these participants to
accept obligations imposed by sources other than the bargaining table, has usually precluded
binding dispute resolution.
25
treaty rules. Interpretations can be adopted only with the support of three-quarters of the overall 'VTO
membership, and such interpretations may not amend the treaty-a change that would be subject to
more stringent procedures. To date, no attempt to utilize new interpretations or clarifications to resolve
ambiguities in the new 'vVTO rules have been successful.
The process of amending the rules is even more complicated. In most cases, amendments can be
proposed by the Ministerial Conference and adopted with the vote of two-thirds of W'TO members.
If the amendment is determined to affect the rights and obligations of member states, however, then
members opposed to the amendment are not bound by it unless three-quarters of the overall WTO
membership votes to give them the option of either accepting the amendment or withdrawing from
the \VTO. Furthermore, amendments to certain rules-those involving WITO decision-making, most
favored nations (MFN) status, tariff schedules, and dispute settlement, for example-must be enacted
by consensus, which is defined as no individual member dissenting publicly.
BARFIELO, supra note 15, at 41.
22. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 410.
23. Trachtman, supra note 11, at 341 (foomotes omitted) (quoting Prosper \Veil, The Court Cannot Conclude
Definitively... Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUim. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 109, 119 (1997)). Professor Tarullo discusses
a related international interpretive doctrine, again honored in the breach by the \rFO DSB, of "in dubio
mitius," i.e., "where a treat' provision is ambiguous, 'that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to
the party assuming an obligation.' Tarullo, supra note 9, at 152 (quoting Robert Jennings & Arthur WVatts
(eds.), I OPPENHEIM'S INT'L L. 1278 (9th ed. 1992)).
24. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7).
25. John Gaffney has described the importance of sovereignty in international law in the following terms:
"[International courts have no jurisdiction in the absence of parties' consent; and sovereign equality is an
unseverable component of the principle of sovereignty in international law." John P. Gaffney, Critical Esay:
Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14
Asi. U. INT'L L. REV. 1173, 1183-84 (1999). See also VATTEL, supra note 19, at xi. This is the reason that, as
Claude Barfield has noted, "[tlraditionally, international law ... has consisted of carefully circumscribed ob-
ligations and rights with few legal remedies for redress of grievances." BARFIELD, supra note 15, at 43.
VOL. 37, NO. 3
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 705
In other words, it is not odd that the United States or some other country give up some
sovereignty in entering into an international agreement. We were taught in International
Law 101 that all international agreements involve the giving up of some sovereignty, in
return for which we receive the benefits of the agreement. Similarly, citizens give up sov-
ereignty (which, at least since the American Revolution, has been considered to arise from
the people) to participate in a functioning society. What is odd about the WTO is the
extent to which we gave up sovereignty without knowing precisely what the WTO would
do with it and without the ability to place essential democratic controls on the results. With
unclear codes and binding dispute settlement, the sacrifice of sovereignty was substantially
open-ended.26
As Raustiala notes, many WTO obligations "go to the heart of what we might consider
core domestic policy," and "the WTO Agreements not only create positive regulatory stan-
dards but they do so by shifting some measure of policy-making power to an international
quasi-judiciary."" These issues have been addressed most vocally in the United States in
the areas of labor and the environment, but they are no less important in the areas of
intellectual property protection (for AIDS-plagued African nations), currency controls (for
Asian nations in crisis), or trade remedies (for U.S. workers that see their jobs threatened
not by more efficient foreign production but by subsidies and pernicious dumping into the
relatively open U.S. market).
Given national sovereignty and lack of democratic controls, binding dispute resolution
can also undermine the negotiation process by chilling enthusiasm for major concessions.
The then-Chairman of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT),
was making exactly this point when he noted that WTO dispute resolution is "looking
more and more like a kangaroo court against U.S. trade laws."21
Third, while courts make law, they do so under strict, well-developed, and fundamental
procedural rules, which protect the interests of the parties and the citizenry generally. Such
procedures are essential for due process, equality, and transparency. In spite of the high-
minded (or high-handed) moniker of "world trade court" given to the DSB, it is anything
but a court.
Panels and the Appellate Body lack the procedural or even sound jurisdictional controls
that constrain judicial bodies. Panelists are appointed ad hoc, and are often linked to Member
26. The WTO should be concerned about these issues. They encourage the shrill cry of hegemony by
faceless bureaucrats heard in the streets of Seattle.
27. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 405-06.
The contrast with the U.S. approach in other areas of foreign policy is striking. Other similar proposals for
surrender of sovereign power to a supranational body include the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
International Criminal Court (ICC). Many world powers do not view the decisions of the former to be binding
(the United States refuses to grant the ICJ jurisdiction), and the United States has certainly refused to ratify
the latter because of sovereignty concerns. The United States is even more reticent to give up sovereignty
in the areas of labor, human rights, and the environment. Yet, puzzlingly, the XVTO has effectively overturned
many U.S. laws and regulations without provoking a loud reaction from the sovereignty hawks in the U.S.
Congress. One possible explanation is the general support for the XVSTO of corporate America (most of which
perceives a net benefit from it). One is left wondering, however, about the abdication by Congress of its
constitutional responsibilities for trade and the absence of sovereignty "hawks" on the question of XVTO
excesses.
28. The United States Mission to the European Union, Senator Baucus Assails Record of WTO Dispute Panel
Rulings (Sept. 26, 2002), at http://www.useu.be/Categories/WTO/Sept2602BaucusRecordWTORulings.html
[hereinafter Baucus].
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nations or the Office of the Secretariat, which undermines any sort of "separation of
powers." Active lobbying by foreign diplomats has occurred behind closed doors at the
WTO. We certainly fail to insist upon the same protections for national actors in the WTO
that we accord individuals in the context of municipal law; yet, the former are simply
representatives of the latter in the international system. Notably, private parties have their
rights compromised in the WTO without having the right to appear or protect their own
interests.
These problems are further complicated by the fact that panel and Appellate Body reports
have themselves been used directly as a new source of international law, that is, as precedent.
This is so despite the fact that stare decisis per se, has traditionally been rejected in interna-
tional law, which was to be established by the practice and negotiations of sovereign nations.
For example, the statute of the International Court of Justice fails to list precedent (stare
decisis) when it lists the authorities the court is to apply.29 And just to ensure that there was
no doubt on the topic, a separate article in the statute states, "[t]he decision of the Court
has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."30
Article 3.2 of the DSU, in mandating that panels cannot create obligations, also indicates
the inappropriateness of strict stare decisis. Yet, WTO panels' reliance on prior decisions is
unmistakable." As Raj Bhala, a professor at the George Washington University explains:
[W]e believe in a myth that the doctrine of stare decisis does not exist or operate in WTO
adjudication, that it was excluded from the pre-Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") dispute settlement system, and continues to be barred from the post-
Uruguay Round WTO system .... It is high time to "come clean" about what is really hap-
pening at the WTO and adjust our doctrinal thinking, and the doctrine itself, accordingly.3 2
Given this environment of binding dispute settlement, unclear substantive provisions,
lack of oversight, absence of procedural protections, and defacto (if not dejure) stare decisis,
it is inevitable that the Appellate Body will carve out a role for itself as the ultimate arbiter
of the WTO rules-Platonic guardians of international trade (with their own goals and
visions).
Kal Raustiala summarizes the issue well when he notes:
[T]he difference between domestic courts and WTO panels is the long acceptance of domestic
courts in the larger constitutional scheme of the US and the knowledge that we have trans-
parent political procedures for staffing them, an active practice of dissent, extensive openness
to amicus curiae, and the means to overrule judicial decisions .... 1
Thus, comparisons that have been made between the famed "Marshall Court" in the early
years of the United States and the Appellate Body are, at best, inapt, and at worse, further
evidence of dramatic overreaching.
Many have noted that the result of these various factors is "judge"-made law in the WTO.
In the Shrimp-Turtle case, for example, the Appellate Body asserted that article XX must
29. Statute of the International Court ofJusticeJune 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031, 1055, T.S. No. 993.
30. Id. art. 59.
31. There are innumerable examples of this; for one, see the discussion below of article 15 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement in US-Steel Plate, in which the panel relies almost exclusively on the determination of
the prior EC-Bed Linen panel regarding the requirements of article 15.
32. Bhala, supra note 1, at 849-52.
33. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 413.
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be read in an "evolutionary" manner.3 4 The problem is not the substance of that decision-
after all, it is not surprising that a panel finds article XX protects some otherwise actionable
activity-but rather with the nature of the Appellate Body's interpretation of its role and
that of the texts that theoretically bind it. By this reading, the terms of the negotiated
agreements could "evolve" into something that none of the original parties to the agree-
ments ever anticipated. Again, this creates new legal obligations for WTO Members with-
out normal controls on the ability to check and balance such "law-giving." As two Canadian
trade lawyers noted in analyzing a panel's decision in Australia-Automotive Leather, even
in case where all parties-the complainant, the respondent, third parties, etc.-were in
agreement on interpretation of certain provisions, WTO panels have completely disre-
garded such consensuses of Members' views on what was negotiated to reach their own
interpretations." As Raustiala has noted, the Shrimp-Turtle decision means that "the scope
and meaning of the GATT exceptions, and hence of the core GATT rules themselves, can
and do evolve. The competence to assess that evolution is apparently the Appellate
Body's."36
Thus, while the system purports solely to interpret the existing agreements neither add-
ing to nor diminishing the parties' obligations, the nature of the agreements and the role
carved out for the panels and the Appellate Body make this an impossibility. While some
of these theoretical concerns were expressed years ago,'7 the past seven years of experience
has demonstrated that, in fact, panels have grossly exceeded their mandate. Claude Barfield
notes that such a system "is not sustainable politically because the imbalance between the
ineffective rule-making procedures and the highly efficient judicial mechanisms will in-
creasingly pressure the panels and the AB to 'create' law, raising intractable questions of
democratic legitimacy."" The second half of Barfield's caution has already proven true.
II. The Institutional Flaws in WTO Dispute Settlement
Have Given Rise to Decisions That Do Not Reflect the
Commitments Negotiated By WTO Members
These conceptual defects have become evident in a series of failures of WTO panels to
constrain themselves to the agreement of the Members. In many instances panels and the
Appellate Body have simply "got it wrong," ignoring negotiated concessions in the process
of constructively interpreting the agreements to conform to their "Platonic" vision of free
trade. The problem is not that there have been honest disagreements about the scope of
some agreements-that is to be expected given the agreements' nature-but rather that the
"judicial" bodies of the W'TO have repeatedly gone contrary to what negotiators under-
stood in the course of negotiations. Certainly the panels have largely ignored the standard
international law doctrine that sovereignty demands that what is not "positively prohibited"
is "permitted." Nor is the problem isolated to one or two incidents.
34. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
VvT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 13.
35. David Wilson & Lynn Starchuk, Judicial Activism in the W7O-lmplications for the Doha Negotiations,
Sept. 2003, at 41-43, available at http://www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/tradejudicial%20Activism%20in
%20the%20TVO.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
36. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 406.
37. E.g., Wolff & Ragosta, supra note 4, at 703-04; Hudec, supra note 7, at 22-24.
38. BARFIELD, supra note 15, at 7.
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Some will argue we cannot expect panels to always be correct. Yet, that is exactly what
we expect (and must expect) from a court. Moreover, while even courts fail, the pattern of
judicial activism and error in the VTO is quite extensive (and all the more pernicious
because of the inability to readily correct it, as discussed above). Even if one could argue
that negotiators were somehow confused as to the meaning of the treaty they signed, this
begs the question of whether VTO panels should be imposing obligations in cases where
there is such an obvious disconnect between what was understood to be agreed to by dif-
ferent parties.3 9 One of the architects of the VITO's DSU, Frieder Roessler, has also criti-
cized the Appellate Body, which in his view "shifted decision-making authority from the
political to the judicial organs of the VVTO, and consequently changed the negotiated
balance in the WTO."4° In other words, a consensus-based approach would be more ap-
propriate in such situations, so that all parties can actually agree to the obligations they
undertake.
Of course, any review of panel decisions will be somewhat subjective. Here, simply as a
limiting and analysis device, we consider primarily decisions relating to implementation of
trade remedy laws. Many will argue that some (or all) of these decisions were soundly based
and that the list and analysis demonstrates the authors' bias. Generally, we will allow the
criticisms to stand on their merits and disagreements concerning particular cases will have
to be deferred until more detailed analyses of each decision is made. Yet, several points are
worth noting.
First, others approaching this issue without the authors' perceived "bias" have come to
the same conclusion. For example, Claude Barfield of the American Enterprise Institute
has done extensive work in this regard.
41
Second, the growing number of cases that raise serious problems demonstrates the degree
of the problem. Even if the authors are wrong in one, or two, or even three cases, the
problem is serious. Thus, after a recent decision in EC-Sardines, a number of WTO Mem-
bers publicly criticized the DSB for judicial activism and creating rights and obligations in
violation of article 3.2 of the DSU.
4 2
39. In this regard, one must be somewhat sympathetic to the EC's position on Beef Hormones. See infra note
59 and accompanying text. Without pretending to analyze the legal aspects of the myriad beef hormone
decisions, accept for the sake of argument that the weight of the scientific evidence does not support the ban.
Accept also that under the terms of the agreement, the EC practices are clearly violative. At the same time, as
a matter of participatory democracy, there seems to be little question that the people of Europe would have
never agreed to the terms of the SPS had they known that they would not be able to restrict the importation
of hormone-laced beef, nor to even label it as imported. Equally, if asked, the people of Europe (and for that
matter, Japan, Canada, and probably the United States) would likely have insisted that any rules on SPS be
subject to some degree of precautionary principle. Others have equally pointed to concerns with phyto-sanitary
concerns as a major problem with the WVTO. See, e.g., Peter Hardstaff, The Precautionary Principle, Trade and
the tPFO, in DiscussioN PAPER FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (2000).
40. Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the WVTO,
Presented by the "Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: the Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium,"
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 200.
41. BARFIELD, supra note 15. See also Tarullo, supra note 9; THE FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDUCATION & RESEARCH,
ENHANCING THE W'VTO's DISPUTE SETrLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: A WORKING GROUP REPORT (Dec. 5, 2002)
(calling, inter alia, for greater deference to national agency action).
42. Minutes of Meeting, \VT/DSB/M/134, Oct. 23, 2002 (circulated Jan. 29, 2003).
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Third, the results are consistent with the theory discussed above, and warnings that
predated the decisions.
43
Fourth, other work in areas outside of the unfair trade statutes shows similar results. For
example, referencing Raustiala, Claude Barfield of the American Enterprise Institute wrote
that WTO panels and the Appellate Body have incorporated "otherwise nonbinding inter-
national standards (e.g., food safety standards)-which themselves are evolving-into the
binding WTO dispute settlement system." 4 At the ABA conference giving rise to this paper,
John Kingery of Crowell & Moring presented an extensive discussion of instances in which
panels exceeded the scope of the WTO agreements by seeking to interpret customary
international law as authoritative in the WTO context in cases not involving the trade
remedies. Also, a pair of Canadian trade lawyers recently wrote a critique of the WTO's
judicial activism concentrating their analysis primarily on non-trade remedy cases.45 While
a full review of such concerns is beyond the scope of this paper, they certainly provide
additional evidence that activist panelists are abusing the system. Following is a non-
exhaustive discussion of areas in which trade panels have engaged in judicial activism (to
undermine the negotiated agreements).
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
One of the key components of any adjudicatory system is the standard that the reviewing
body should utilize in deferring to reasonable factual determinations rendered by the rele-
vant investigating authorities. The primary considerations for deference to factual deter-
minations by investigative authorities include the technical expertise of the investigators,
43. James Bacchus, of the WTO's Appellate Body, has claimed that panel and Appellate Body reports do
not create new obligations:
[T~he fact that the meaning that one member may happen to see, however clearly, for a particular
word or provision or obligation does not happen to prevail after a full and fair hearing ... does not
mean that the DSB has either added or diminished the rights and obligations of that member that are
provided in the covered agreement.
James Bacchus, Appellate Body Chair Dismisses Charges of Erceeding Mandate, INSInE U.S. TRADE (May 31, 2002).
Equally, the fact that a member of the AB says that the AB has not added to or diminished obligations does
not make it so. Certainly, when Mr. Bacchus was a Member of Congress, he would have agreed that when
U.S. negotiators told Congress that a certain result had been achieved, that prior GATT decisions supported
that result, that other countries outside of dispute settlement conceded that result, that the texts supported or,
at least, did not contradict that result ... the VTO could not impose the result. But, as documented below,
that has happened repeatedly. See also Hudec, supra note 7, at 22-24; Wolff & Ragosta, supra note 4, at 703;
cf. Statement of Administrative Action for the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, 656, 1012 (1994) [hereinafter SAA]; 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (a)(1), (2) (making clear that Congressional
legislation-and, thus, Congress' understanding-controls U.S. law and administrative action).
Of course, Mr. Bacchus' position makes it difficult for him to discuss particular cases. Yet, his public state-
ments in support of the \VTO and increased trade liberalization themselves raise serious questions about the
independence of the WTO "judiciary." See, e.g., James Bacchus, The Bicycle Club: Affirming the American
Interest in the Future of the VVTO, Remarks to the Washington International Trade Association (Nov. 12,
2002) (manuscript on file with the authors). After all, setting aside problems with the cutely-named but un-
proven bicycle trade theory, claiming that everyone at the W'TO supports greater trade liberalization, id.,
misses the point. We would, no doubt, be surprised if ChiefJustice Rehnquist gave a speech promoting greater
deregulation-while everyone in theory supports deregulation, complicated questions of costs, public health,
participatory democracy, environmental impact, cost/benefit, etc. must be answered before deregulation occurs,
and it would simply be inappropriate for Chief Justice Rehnquist to pontificate in this manner.
44. BARFIELD, Supra note 15, at 45.
45. See Wilson & Starchuk, supra note 35.
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the ability of the investigating authority to review the evidence firsthand (through written
submissions or oral hearings), the investigating authority's familiarity with the governing
statute, the inefficiencies involved in having a de novo review of factual issues, and the
accountability of the administering agency to the public (including democratic controls).
The importance of such considerations is naturally heightened in the international con-
text, and in the area of trade remedies, given that internationally composed panels are
reviewing detailed factual determinations administered by national government agencies,
which inherently reflect political, social, and economic choices made by duly elected gov-
ernment officials. 46 As Professor Jackson rightly points out, the standard of review question
presents practical problems for trade negotiators in dealing with conflicting views over the
sharing of power, as well as from a theoretical perspective by raising important questions
about the very nature of international institutions and the need for checks and balances.
47
Given the factually intensive nature of trade remedy proceedings conducted by the
United States' administering agencies (investigations in antidumping and countervailing
duty proceedings frequently take over a year, with multiple questionnaires and responses
and on-site verification of data, and often scores of thousands of pages on the record), this
was undoubtedly a key element for the United States in the Uruguay Round negotiations
concerning dispute settlement.
Thus, the United States made negotiation of an appropriate standard of review a key
element of any agreement; indeed, the standard of review question was on the short list of
items deemed to be "deal breakers" for the entire negotiations.4 During the Uruguay
Round negotiations, the United States made several proposals that would implement a
restrictive standard of review to WV TO dispute resolution.
4 9
Ultimately, the Members agreed to several instruments reflecting the appropriate stan-
dard of review for WVTO dispute resolution. First, article 17.6(i) of the Antidumping Agree-
ment stipulates:
[I]n its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities'
establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased
and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and
objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation
shall not be overturned .... so
Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement is accompanied by two relevant ministerial
documents, also negotiated during the Uruguay Round. The first, a Ministerial Declaration
on Dispute Settlement, provides, "with respect to dispute settlement pursuant to the Agree-
ment on Implementation of article VI of GATT 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on
46. Philip A. Akakwam, The Standard of Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code: Circumscribing the Role of GA IT
Panels in Reviewing NationalAntidumping Determinations, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 277, 284 (1996).
47. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO 135-36 (2000).
48. Id. at 135.
49. Gary N. Horlick & Pegg, A. Clarke, Standards for Panels Reviewing Antidumping Determinations under
the GATT and WTO, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
313 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1977).
50. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr.
15, 1994, \VT OAgreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter Anti-dumping Agreement].
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Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the need for the consistent resolution of disputes
arising from anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures."5
The second, a Ministerial Decision on article 17.6 provides: "The standard of review in
paragraph 6 of Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of article VI of GATT 1994
shall be reviewed after a period of three years with a view to considering the question of
whether it is capable of general application."52
The fact that the United States negotiated for these stipulations (presumably giving up
other concessions to do so) has not stopped WTO panels from reviewing national inves-
tigating authorities essentially de novo-and thus ignoring the negotiated-for provision. The
detrimental effect that such an approach would have on the dispute settlement process as
a whole was predicted at the time of passage of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agree-
ment (URAA):
The United States has expressed the view in the GAT, and will maintain the view in the
WTO, that in making its assessment of the case a panel should refrain from opining on com-
plex, unsettled issues of domestic law. Panels that base their reports on opinions purporting to
resolve such issues risk raising questions about the immediate and continued validity of their
reports and may undermine confidence in the dispute settlement process.5 3
Nevertheless, more often that not, the valuable contribution made by investigating
agencies to the dispute settlement process is largely ignored by WTO panels that are all
too willing to allow parties to re-litigate at the WTO key factual and legal interpretations
that had been properly rejected by national investigating authorities. Two examples are
illustrative.
Perhaps the clearest example was in United States-Antidumping and Countervailing Mea-
sures on Steel Plate from India, where the panel concluded that the U.S. rejection of infor-
mation submitted by the Steel Authority of India (SAIL) in a Title VII investigation was
improper, even though substantially all of the information needed for the calculation of
SAIL's dumping margin was not submitted timely and determined by the U.S. Department
of Commerce (Commerce) after extensive on-site investigation (beyond both the purview
and the ability of the VVTO panelists), to be virtually completely unusable.5 4 During the
extensive investigation, which included the issuance of multiple questionnaires, verification,
etc., Commerce had determined that information submitted by SAIL suffered from num-
bers of infirmities:
[A]t verification the Department discovered that SAIL failed to report a significant number of
home market sales; was unable to verify the total quantity and value of home market sales; and
failed to provide reliable cost or constructed value data for the products .... SAIL was provided
with numerous opportunities and extensions of time to fully respond to the Department's
51. Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, XVVTO Agreement, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1226 [hereinafter Declaration on Dispute Settlement].
52. Decision on Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND (1994).
53. SAA, supra note 43, at 1012.
54. Report of the Panel, United States-Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India,
WT/DS206/R/Corr.I (June 28, 2002), available at 2002 WL 1425561 (XV.T.O.) [hereinafter Antidumping
Report].
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original and supplemental questionnaires, as well as ample time to prepare for verification.
However, even with numerous opportunities to remedy problems, SAIL failed to provide re-
liable data to the Department in the form and manner requested.
S.. we note that as a result of the widespread problems encountered at verification, SAIL's
questionnaire responses could not be verified.
... we gave SAIL numerous opportunities and extensions to submit complete and accurate
data. As stated in the Preliminary Determination, SAIL's questionnaire and deficiency ques-
tionnaire responses were found to be substantially deficient and untimely for purposes of cal-
culating an accurate antidumping margin.... However, subsequent to the preliminary deter-
mination we issued two additional questionnaires and further extensions to SAIL presenting
it yet additional opportunities to submit a complete and accurate electronic database. Never-
theless, the Department found at verification that the final submission was again substantially
deficient ... 55
Nonetheless, in what the WTO panel itself labeled as a "highly fact specific issue, '5 6 the
panel determined that the U.S. agency had acted improperly in concluding that the nu-
merous flaws in SAIL's data submissions caused the information to be on the whole un-
reliable and inadequate to produce an accurate dumping margin. Such a conclusion, of
course, properly resides with Commerce-the agency best equipped in terms of time, access
to information, personnel, etc. and most experienced in administering the U.S. antidumping
laws.
57
In another such example, the Appellate Body failed to allow reasonable discretion in
United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ruling
that the United States violated article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by refusing to
accept information from a Japanese respondent after the administrative deadline for sub-
mission of such information had passed.
58
Another case, EC-Beef Hormones,"9 although not a trade remedies case, provides inter-
esting learning concerning the trade remedy standard of review. There, both the panel and
Appellate Body ruled that the EC restrictions on the importation of certain hormone treated
beef, ostensibly instituted because the EC believed that the imported products posed a
health risk, were contrary to the SPS Agreement. The panel, after declaring that the as-
55. Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate Products from India, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,126, 73,127
(Dec. 29, 1999) (final det.).
56. Antidumping Report, supra note 54.
57. The U.S. Court of Internatonal Trade has labeled the Commerce Department the "'master' of anti-
dumping law" based on the agency's technical expertise and broad experience. See Daewoo Elec. Co. v. United
States, 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., Inc., 753 F.2d 1033, 1039
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
58. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products
from Japan, XVT/DS184/AB/R, IT 66, 82 (July 24, 2001), available at 2001 WTO DS LEXIS 34 [hereinafter
Report of the Appellate Body on Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan].
Citing these and other cases, Professor Tarullo concludes simply that, "Without some other explanation,
we must conclude that the AB has chosen to read [Article] 17.6(ii) out of the [Antidumping] Agreement."
Tarullo, supra note 9, at 152-53.
59. Report of the Panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), '\WT/DS26/R (Aug.
18, 1997), available at http://doconline.wto.org [hereinafter Panel Report on Meat Hormones]; Report of the
Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), \VT/DS26/AB/R (Feb. 13,1998),
available at 1998 WVTO DS LEXIS 5 [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on Meat Hormones].
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sessment of risk to health required under the SPS Agreement necessarily involved a "sci-
entific examination of data and factual studies," 6 examined such scientific evidence sua
sponte, and concluded that the EC had not presented scientific results justifying the import
ban .61
Significantly, even though this investigation arose under the SPS Agreement, and was
not covered by the stringent standard of review of article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, upon
appeal to the Appellate Body, the EC argued that the panel failed to afford the appropriate
level of deference to the EC's conclusion that the ban on hormone treated beef was nec-
essary to avert a health risk.62 The EC argued that "all highly complex factual situations"
require a "deferential 'reasonableness' standard" of review. 63 The Appellate Body, even with-
out the application of AD article 17.6, stated that it was inappropriate for panels to conduct
a de novo review of the findings of national authorities but noted that "total deference" was
also not warranted. In the view of the Appellate Body, the appropriate standard of review
consists of a panel's "objective assessment of the facts," pursuant to article 11 of the DSU.
In explaining a panel's duty under article 11, however, the Appellate Body did not discuss
the amount of deference afforded the findings of national authorities, but rather, assumed
that the article 1 1 obligation not only permits, but in fact requires, a panel to affirmatively
make factual findings: "The duty to make an objective assessment of the facts is, among
other things, an obligation to consider the evidence presented to a panel and to make factual
findings on the basis of that evidence."64
In general, panels are ill suited to make factual findings of this nature and certainly must
instead defer to any reasonable finding of expert agencies based on voluminous records and
years of technical experience when the provisions of AD article 17.6 are at issue. The factual
information received by panels is a small fraction of the administrative record, and is gen-
erally subject to the filtering of the parties to the dispute through briefs and attachments.
Panels do not have the time or expertise to develop, much less analyze, a thorough official
record of evidence. Panels do not have the power to order discovery of key documents;
facts are generally not independently verified, etc.
65
The Appellate Body then went on to explain the deference afforded to a particular panel's
factual findings, but not the findings of national investigating authorities.
The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incom-
patible with a panel's duty to make an objective assessment of the facts. The willful distortion
or misrepresentation of the evidence put before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an ob-
jective assessment of the facts. "Disregard" and "distortion" and "misrepresentation" of the
evidence, in their ordinary signification in judicial and quasi-judicial processes, imply not sim-
ply an error of judgment in the appreciation of evidence but rather an egregious error that
calls into question the good faith of a panel. A claim that a panel disregarded or distorted the
evidence submitted to it is, in effect, a claim that the panel, to a greater or lesser degree, denied
the party submitting the evidence fundamental fairness, or what in many jurisdictions is known
as due process of law or natural justice' 6
60. Panel Report on Meat Hormones, supra note 59, 9 8.94.
61. Id. 9] 9.1.
62. Appellate Body Report on Meat Hormones, supra note 59, 110.
63. Id. 113.
64. Id. 1 133 (emphasis added).
65. See Hudec, supra note 7, at 39.
66. Appellate Body Report on Meat Hormones, supra note 59, $ 133.
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The U.S. Congress has duly noted the inappropriate lack of deference exhibited by WTO
panels towards national investigating authorities. As bluntly stated in the Senate Finance
Committee's report accompanying "fast track" Trade Promotion Authority:
Wv7TO panels and the Appellate Body have ignored their obligation to afford an appropriate
level of deference to the technical expertise, factual findings, and permissible legal interpre-
tations of national investigating authorities.. . . The record compiled so far in reviews of
antidumping duty, countervailing duty, and safeguard measures reflects a bias against import
relief... [and] is particularly troubling, because the right to act against dumped, subsidized,
and surging imports is a fundamental part of the multilateral trade regime.... Foreign gov-
ernments' successful use of dispute settlement procedures to erode bargained-for trade remedy
protections negatively affects American firms, workers, and farmers and may jeopardize public
support for a liberal trading system.
68
Such stern warnings are likely to be wholly ineffective absent more aggressive Congres-
sional oversight. Yet, it is highly relevant that a growing number of observers are voicing
their concern about panels' disregard of the proper standard of review, especially in trade
remedy cases where the standard of review is particularly deferential."9
Commentators may point out in defense of WTO decisions that, other than article 17.6
of the Antidumping Agreement and related Ministerial documents (discussed in more detail
below), and article 11 of the DSU (discussed above), the WTO agreements do not contain
specific language directing panels and the Appellate Body to an appropriate standard of
review.'0 Yet, under pre-WTO GATT decisions, when faced with the prospect that judicial
activism would be blocked, panels viewed it as normal international procedure that there
would be reasonable deference to national authorities even though no specific provisions
in agreements mandated such deference." Thus, Roessler, the former head of the GAIF
Legal Affairs Division, sounded a warning to WTO panels on deference to national trade
remedy laws and determinations:
Many decisions on trade policy matters that Members of the WTO take under their domestic
law-such as the decision to impose safeguard measures or to grant adjustment assistance-
are taken by specialised agencies with broad discretion. Just as the domestic courts respect the
competence and discretionary powers of such agencies, WTO panels should respect the
67. Professor Tarullo notes tellingly that the "most explicit application of the [art. 17.6] standard is found
where the arguments of the importing country seem particularly weak, and thus quite clearly do not offer a
'permissible' reading of the text." Tarullo, supra note 9, at 147. In other words, panels pay lip-service to the
standard of review when they can do so without interfering with their judicial activism.
68. See S. REP. No. 107-139, at 8 (2002) [hereinafter Finance Committee Report] (report of the Senate
Finance Committee accompanying the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act).
69. See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 9; BARFIELD, supra note 15; Raustiala, supra note 5.
70. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, 14TO Dispute Panel Deference to National Government
Decisions, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATTF/WTO DisPtrrE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 193 (Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). For a description of the negotiations of standard of review provisions in AD
cases, see generally, Horlick & Clarke, supra note 49, at 317-18.
71. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 101 for a discussion concerning pre-WTO GATT cases con-
cerning the practice of zeroing. See also Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession
Under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT/CP/1 06 (Mar. 27, 1951), available
at 1951 GATTPD LEXIS 7.
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competence and discretionary powers of the political bodies established under the WTO
agreements."
Significantly, U.S. negotiators are now struggling with the question of whether to seek
clarification of at least the trade remedies standard of review in the Doha Round of nego-
tiations. Indeed, the recently passed legislation granting the President Trade Promotion
Authority requires that such clarification be sought.73 There is, reportedly, a strong feeling
among many that even if the standard is, again, clarified, panels will simply pay lip-service
to the newly clarified standard and proceed to do what they want. Thus, the analysis suggests
that no "chits" should be expended in correcting this problem (and "paying twice" for what
should have been implicit in the nature of international dispute settlement). Given the
performance of the DSB to date, this concern is understandable, but a suggestion that the
United States should not seek a clarification is not. After all either panels will abide strictly
by the standard of review if clarified in the agreements or they will not. If the latter is true
as many apparently believe, then honesty (not to mention interest) and honor dictates that
the United States seeks an end to the experiment of binding WVTO dispute settlement as
currently formulated. The alternative-continued binding dispute settlement recognizing
the futility of providing direction to binding and uncontrollable panels-would evidence a
sad charade. As Professor Tarullo notes: "To disregard a rule for dispute settlement that
was plainly negotiated, and at least formally agreed, is to call into question the entire basis
for positive international law."'7 4 The United States should insist upon clarification.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES
A related problem arises with respect to panel decisions on the applicability of the article 17.6
(of the Antidumping Agreement) standard of review to countervailing duty cases. Having in-
sisted that such a standard be incorporated expressly in the Antidumping Agreement (which,
as a practical matter, was far more hotly contested than the Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures agreement in the Uruguay Round negotiations), after the Geneva ministerial, which
nominally concluded the Round, U.S. negotiators realized that the same standard, while clearly
necessary and appropriate, had not been expressly incorporated in the SCM. Thus, prior to
signing the final agreements, the United States insisted that this be corrected.
Recognizing the rationality and force of the U.S. claim the other Members agreed. Before
signing the Marrakesh Agreements, the United States obtained a Ministerial Declaration
confirming "the need for the consistent resolution of disputes arising from anti-dumping
and countervailing duty measures.""5 As the Antidumping Agreement lays out a clear stan-
dard of review in article 17.6, it would seem that a resolution of CVD cases that is "con-
sistent" with the method used to decide anti-dumping disputes would provide for the use
of that standard. The Administration's and Congress' understanding is expressed in the
Statement of Administrative Action (SAA): "A Ministerial Declaration accompanying the
Uruguay Round Agreements provides for the 'consistent resolution' of disputes arising from
72. Roessler, supra note 40.
73. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, H.R. 3005, 107th Cong. § 2101 (2002) (enacted)
[hereinafter TPA].
74. Tarullo, supra note 9, at 171.
75. Declaration on Dispute Settlement, supra note 51.
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the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duty measures through the application




In U.S.-Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products, however, the DSB was faced with this
very question. The EU challenged the United States' application of its countervailing duty
law against subsidized lead bar imports from the United Kingdom, arguing that the pri-
vatization of a state-owned manufacturer not only reduced the likelihood of future subsidies,
but also extinguished prior subsidies. The SCM Agreement did not explicitly resolve the
issue, and the only provision that expressly discusses change-in-ownership methodology
appeared to favor the U.S. position that privatization does not extinguish prior subsidies to
the state-owned enterprise. 7
Relying on these and other arguments, the United States further asserted that the EU
has a heavy burden under the appropriate standard of review. The United States argued
that, by virtue of the Ministerial Declaration, the article 17.6 standard of review is applicable
to countervailing duty proceedings as well as antidumping proceedings." The United States
pointed out that this was particularly appropriate given the EC's argument in Beef Hormone
(discussed above) where, even without the applicability of the Ministerial Declaration, the
EC argued for the rationality of a deferential standard in international dispute settlement.
Yet, the Appellate Body, confirming the panel's contention that the article 17.6 standard
should not apply equally to countervailing duty cases, reasoned that:
By its own terms, the Declaration does not impose an obligation to apply the standard of review
contained in Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to disputes involving countervailing
duty measures .... The Declaration is couched in hortatory language; it uses the words "Min-
isters recognize."... It does not specify any specific action to be taken ... it does not prescribe
a standard of review to be applied.79
Here, to say that the Declaration is couched in hortatory language is to say that it means
nothing at all, despite the fact that it was a key result of negotiations on which the United
States and other nations relied. Moreover, language such as "recognize" is commonly used
in international texts to denote agreement. The Appellate Body does not explain what the
Ministerial Declaration means if not the applicability of the AD standard. Nor is there any
76. SAA, supra note 43, at 818.
77. Article 27.13 of the SCM Agreement provides:
The provisions of Part III [VTO challenges to subsidies as distinguished from countervailing duty
actions] shall not apply to direct forgiveness of debts, subsidies to cover social costs, in whatever form,
including relinquishment of government revenue and other transfer of liabilities when such subsidies
are granted within and directly linked to a privatization programme of a developing country Member,
provided that both such programme and the subsidies involved are granted for a limited period and
notified to the Committee and that the programme results in eventual privatization of the enterprise
concerned.
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, in LEGAL
TEXTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 231 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
78. Report of the Panel, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WVT/DS138/R, 9 6.9-6.11 (Dec. 23, 1999),
available at 1999 WTO DS LEXIS 26 [hereinafter Report of the Panel on Hot-Rolled Lead].
79. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, \VT/DS138/AB/R, (May 10, 2000),
available at 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 20 [hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body on Hot-Rolled Lead].
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logical reason to apply different standards of review in antidumping and countervailing duty
proceedings. In the end, the WTO DSB simply decided, regardless of the Members' de-
cision in the Ministerial Declaration that no special deference was called for.
C. CAUSATION STANDARD FOR INJURY DETERMINATIONS
The Japan-Hot-Rolled Steel and Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel H-Beams from Poland decisions on the causation standard
for injury findings 0 also provide good examples of judicial activism by WTO panels.8l
In Japan-Hot Rolled Steel, criticizing the earlier GA'T case of U.S.-Atlantic Salmon,
the Appellate Body held that investigating authorities must separate and distinguish the
harm caused by each factor contributing to a domestic industry's injury, rather than simply
determining that material injury found to exist is caused, at least in material and substantial
part, by unfairly traded imports. "This requires a satisfactory explanation of the nature and
extent of the injurious effects of the other factors, as distinguished from the injurious effects
of the dumped imports."8 2
Given the potentially high number of major and minor "other factors," this new standard
appears effectively to impose a nearly impossible duty on the responsible national author-
ities. Not only does the Appellate Body seem to require national authorities to perform a
nearly impossible analysis-one that specifies the precise amount of injury caused by each
factor contributing to a domestic industry's injury-it also overturned prior GATT cases
on which Members reasonably relied in signing the Uruguay Round agreements and leg-
islated new obligations not otherwise agreed to by the Members.
By contrast, in both cases concerning U.S. duties on Atlantic salmon (AD and CVD), a
GATT panel ruled that the ITC was not obligated to identify the extent of injury from
other factors or to somehow "isolate the injury caused by these factors from the injury
caused by the imports ..... -3 Analyzing the text of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Agreement,
it had noted that article 6:4 did not contain a requirement of "identification of the extent
of injury caused by these possible other factors," but that it merely required that "injuries
caused by other factors not be attributed to the imports under investigation. '0 4 The fact
that the International Trade Commission (ITC) acknowledged that, "other factors may
have contributed," but still decided that the "imports from Norway... had contributed to
price declines in the United States," was sufficient for the panel to uphold the ITC causation
80. The causation of injury standard has been termed "the most important area of anti-dumping practice"
on the basis that it is most often the decisive determination in antidumping duty proceedings. Horlick & Clarke,
supra note 49, at 315.
81. See Report of the Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, kVT/DSI84/R (Feb. 28, 2001), available at 2001 \XO DS LEXIS 11; Report of the Appellate Body
on Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, supra note 58.
82. Report of the Appellate Body on Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, supra note 58.
83. Report of the Panel, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, SCIM/153, ' 321 (Apr. 28, 1994), available at 1992 GATTPD LEXIS 20 [here-
inafter Countervailing Duties on Salmon from Norway]. The section on causation analysis is virtually identical in
both the CVD and the AD case decisions. See Report of the Panel, United States-Imposition ofAnti-dumping
Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, 555 (Apr. 27, 1994), available at
1992 GATFPD LEXIS 21 [hereinafter Anti-dumping Duties on Salmon from Norway].
84. Countervailing Duties on Salmon from Norway, supra note 83, 9 318; Anti-dumping Duties on Salmon from
Norway; supra note 83, 9 552.
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analysis.s Even without an express standard of review, an appropriate and reasonable stan-
dard was applied.
Significantly, the relevant terms of the Uruguay Round agreements cannot justify such a
radical departure from these prior GATT panel conclusions. For example, with respect to
antidumping, the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code provided:
It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects [as set forth in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article] of dumping, causing injury within the meaning of this Code.
There may be other factors which at the same time are injuring the industry, and the injuries
caused by other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. 6
The same provision in the WTO Antidumping Agreement now reads essentially the
same but the sentence highlighted below has been added:
It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set
forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The dem-
onstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the
domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the
authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped
imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by
these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be
relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping
prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in
technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry. 7
The WTO SCM Agreement contains similar non-material changes from the Tokyo Round
Agreements.
88
Thus, there is nothing that has changed in the text of the agreements to suggest that the
causation standard reasonably relied upon by the Members itself had been materially or
fundamentally altered during the Uruguay Round negotiations. U.S. negotiators and leg-
islators confirmed this during the passage of the URAA. The SAA specifically provides that,
"[a]rticle 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement and 15.5 of the Subsidies Agreement do not
change the causation standard from that provided in the 1979 Tokyo Round Codes." s9
The URAA SAA explained that "[t]he GAT 1947 Panel Report in the Norwegian
Salmon case approved U.S. practice as consistent with the 1979 Codes. The panel noted
that the [U.S. International Trade] Commission need not isolate the injury caused by other
factors from injury caused by unfair imports."'8 0 Yet the Appellate Body decided otherwise,
85. Countervailing Duties on Salmon from Norway, supra note 83, 9 323; Anti-dumping Duties on Salmon from
Norway, supra note 83, T 557.
86. Agreement on Implementation of Article V7 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12,
1979, art. 3(4), GATT B.I.S.D (26th Supp.) at 171, 174 (1980) [hereinafter Antidumping Code] (citations
included in text). Such factors include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition
between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology, and the export performance and
productivity of the domestic industry.
87. Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 50.
88. Cf Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) art. 6(4), at 56, 65 (1980), with SCM Agreement,
supra note 77, art. 15.5.
89. SAA, supra note 43, at 851.
90. Id.
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this time ignoring GATT precedent and according no deference to the agency determi-
nation, and creating a significant new restraint never agreed upon by the Members.
Simply put: It has been the U.S. practice, accepted by GATT panels and shared by other
Members that national investigating authorities would not have to separate, distinguish,
and weigh harm caused by each potential factor relating to a domestic industry's material
injury. They would simply need to find that material injury exists and that unfairly traded
imports are among the material causes, while taking into account other possible causes.
While some U.S. court decisions have required that ITC decisions concerning alternative
causes be supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with the law (the
statutory standard of review),9 ' U.S. courts' criticisms of the ITC are much less activist than
the newly-minted requirements sought to be imposed in Japan-Hot Rolled Steel, and cer-
tainly cannot be said to justify the DSB's actions. For instance, in Gerald Metals, Inc. v.
United States,9 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit criticized the ITC for not
adequately addressing the "causal nexus" between dumped imports from the Ukraine and
injury to the domestic industry. The court cautioned:
Determining the accurate causation of a disrupted market expectation . . . requires careful
economic evidence and analysis. The antidumping statute requires that the Commission con-
sider all relevant economic factors "within the context of the business cycle and conditions of
competition that are distinctive to the affected industry."
... [Tihe statute requires adequate evidence to show that the harm occurred "by reason of"
the . .. [dumped] imports, not by reason of a minimal or tangential contribution to material
harm caused by... [dumped] goods. 9"
Such admonitions however are far less reaching than the decision in Japan-Hot Rolled
Steel, which questions not merely the care and completeness of the agency's review of the
record evidence, but rather the very standard under which the evidence is to be evaluated.
Separately, the Tbailand-Steel H-Beams from Poland panel held that even after concluding
that evidence relating to several of the fifteen injury factors listed in the Antidumping
Agreement demonstrates material injury caused by dumping, an investigating authority is
required to make specific findings concerning the other factors, and to supply a "persuasive
explanation" of how evaluation of each one supported an affirmative determination.9 4 In
essence, the panel sought to turn the Antidumping Agreement's list of relevant factors into
something it was never intended to be-a series of fifteen hurdles over which an authority
must jump before making an affirmative finding of causation of injury. The task outlined
by the panel, if taken at face value, is, again, virtually an impossible one. More significantly,
the WTO panel here engaged in legislating, not judicial decision-making. It created new
obligations for the WTO Members without their consent.
D. THE PRACTICE OF ZEROING IN ANTIDUMPING CASES
In EC-Bed Linen, the WTO ruled that the common practice of "zeroing" instances of
91. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2002).
92. Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d. 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 72 1-22.
94. Report of the Panel, Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy
Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS 122/R (Sept. 28, 2000), available at 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 29.
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non-dumping when calculating average dumping margins was impermissible. 91 "Zeroing"
refers to the process of not offsetting dumped sales with sales that are not dumped. The
reason for the practice is simple-to allow dumping in selected segments of the market (or
during selected periods), because un-dumped sales elsewhere or at other times would permit
the targeting of customers, and the use of dumping to gain market share.
Whatever the merits of the practice, it was certainly not the understanding when the
Uruguay Round agreements were signed that it was prohibited, as major users of the anti-
dumping law all engaged in the practice of "zeroing" and none modified their practice in
light of the agreements. 96 In fact, particular proposals to eliminate zeroing during the Uru-
guay Round negotiations were rejected. 97
More to the point, the Antidumping Agreement cited by the W-[TO panel and Appellate
Body do not contain any implicit or explicit renunciation by WTO Members of the right
to use zeroing in AD calculations. Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement requires
only that weighted average normal value be compared with weighted average export prices
for "comparable" transactions. "Article 2.4.2 provides no guidance as to how the 'dumping
margins' determined for individual product types should be combined in order to calculate
an overall rate of dumping for the product under investigation."98 While some might say
this leaves the issue ambiguous, two compelling reasons demonstrate the panel's over-
reaching.
First, generally, if a sovereign has failed to agree not to exercise particular authority, that
authority remains. On appeal to the Appellate Body, the EC argued that the panel did not
determine that the EC's practice of "zeroing" was an impermissible interpretation of article
2.4.2, a finding necessitated under the standard of review applicable to provisions of the
Antidumping Agreement.99 The Appellate Body, however, assumed that the panel made this
finding of "impermissibility" based on its determination that the practice of "zeroing" was
inconsistent with article 2.4.2.i00
Second, GATT panel decisions (adopted and unadopted) had found that the practice of
zeroing was not inconsistent with the 1979 Anti-Dumping Agreement.' 0' In EC-Cotton
Yarn, the GATT panel specifically determined that "'zeroing' did not arise at the point at
which the actual determination of the relevant prices was undertaken," but that it "was
undertaken subsequently to the making of allowances necessary to ensure price compara-
bility in accordance with the obligation contained in the second sentence of Article 2:6." 102
95. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type
Bed Linen from India, XVT/DS141/AB/R, 1 63-64 (Mar. 1, 2001), available at 2001 VTO DS LEXIS 13
[hereinafter EC-Bed Linens] (citing art. 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement).
96. The EC clearly did not change its practice after the Uruguay Round. See id. The U.S. law directs
zeroing under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A), (B) (2002). Canadian law also apparently authorizes zeroing under
Special Import Measures Act (SLMA), R.S.C., ch. S- 15, § 30.2 (1) (1985) (Can.).
97. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1539-43, (Terrence P. Stew-
art ed., 1993). See generally discussion of this case in Tarullo, supra note 9.
98. EC-Bed Linens, supra note 95, 1 11.
99. Id. 9 63-64 (citing AD Agreement, art. 17.6(ii)).
100. Id. 9 65.
101. See, e.g., Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, EC-Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton Yarn from Brazil, GATT/ADP/137, $ 499-502 (July 4, 1995), available at 1995 GATTDP LEXIS 3
[hereinafter EC-Cotton Yarn from Brazil]; EC-Antidumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in
Japan, GATT/ADP/136, 19 355, 358 (Apr. 28, 1995) (unadopted).
102. EC-Cotton Yarn from Brazil, supra note 101, ] 501.
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Absent a very clear basis to find otherwise, these GATT decisions should have been un-
derstood to reflect the intent of the Members. The WTO panels, in their Platonic judg-
ment, simply decided that the Members must have agreed to change the law despite the
lack of clear requirement, the contrary decisions in prior GATT cases, and the evidence
contained in the negotiating history of the WTO agreements.
E. ANTIDUMPING MARGINS FOR EXPORTERS NOT INDIVIDUALLY INVESTIGATED
In Japan-Hot-Rolled, the Appellate Body also held that investigating authorities may not
include among the company-specific dumping margins averaged to establish an antidump-
ing duty deposit rate for companies not individually investigated, any company-specific
margin based even in part on "facts available." ("Facts available" means the best information
the investigating authority can get, usually, but not always, because the firm charged with
dumping refuses to supply any information or supplies clearly erroneous information.)
Again, the constraint imposed by the WTO DSB simply has no basis in the text of the
Antidumping Agreement, which expressly allows weight-averaging, based on numbers pro-
vided "by other exporters or producers" company specific margins.""i The code expressly
recognizes the use of facts available. 104 There is not a hint in the text that these two pro-
visions cannot be read together. Moreover, often (and Japan-Hot-Rolled Steel is a good
example) there are no company-specific margins that are 100 percent derived from the
respondent's own information. In such a situation, the investigating authority, under the
new obligations created by the Appellate Body, is left without any means of establishing an
"all others" margin. Clearly this was not intended, but demonstrating not only judicial
activism but a lack of familiarity with the operation of the laws, the Appellate Body was
undeterred. Lack of practical knowledge and judicial activism make a dangerous mix.
F. COUNTERVAILABILITY OF SUBSIDIES AFTER CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP (PRIVATIZATION)
A recent Appellate Body decision, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain EU
Products,1°5 vastly expands the erroneous, albeit ostensibly limited, ruling in the earlier Lead
and Bismuth decision""6 and essentially holds that an investigating authority must always
excuse (i.e., may not countervail) pre-change-in-ownership subsidies.
The economic fallacy of the VTO decision, although clear,'°7 is not alone in the issue,
and a full explication of the privatization issue will have to await a future article. The point
here is that the SCM Agreement contains no such rule. The only mention of privatization
in the SCM Agreement, article 27.13, gives special and differential treatment to developing
103. Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 50, art. 27.13.
104. Id. art. 6.8; SCM Agreement, supra note 77, art. 12.7.
105. Report of the Panel, United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the Euro-
pean Communities, WVT/DS212/R (July 31, 2002), available at 2002 X\L 1765613 (W.T.O.) [hereinafter Report
of the Panel on Certain Products from the European Communities; Report of the Appellate Body, United
States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, \VrT/DS212/AB/R
(Dec. 9, 2002), available at 2002 WL 31761823 (W.T.O.) [hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body on Certain
Products from the European Communities].
106. Report of the Panel on Hot-Rolled Lead, supra note 78; Report of the Appellate Body on Hot-Rolled
Lead, supra note 79.
107. See Amicus Curiae Submission of American Iron and Steel Institute, in United States-Countervailing
Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities DS138 (Sept. 19, 2002), at htnp://www.
steel.org/images/pdfs/AlSlamicusABsubmission.pdf [hereinafter AISI Submission].
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country members by creating an exception providing that certain types of subsidies provided
by a developing country during privatization is not actionable at the DSB after privatization.
The only reasonable corollary as the United States pointed out is that the general rule
under the SCM Agreement is that subsidies provided prior to privatization are actionable
after privatization, that is, are allocable to the privatized company's production. With no
other textual provision on privatization, this appeared to be compelling evidence.
The initial panel in the Lead Bar decision refused to consider article 27.13 because it
conflicted with its own notion of how pre-privatization subsidies should be treated, stating:
We are particularly hesitant [to rely on Article 27.13] given that the conclusion we are asked
to draw-namely that there is no requirement under Part V of the SCM Agreement for "ben-
efit" to be re-identified or re-measured at some time subsequent to the initial bestowal of the
"financial contribution"-is contrary to what we consider to be the proper interpretation of
the term "benefit."1°8
In other words, the panel ignored a textual provision because its obvious implications
were inconsistent with the added requirement that the panel had (wrongly) implied from
the definition of "benefit." While agreeing that the subsidies were not actionable in that
particular case, the AB in Lead Bar issued what seemed to be a very narrow ruling and
avoided altogether the issue of article 27.13.'09
The second panel, however, ignored the narrow reading possible under the AB's first
decision and rejected the United States' reasonable interpretation, ignoring altogether
article 27.13, the only provision referring explicitly to privatization. 0 The panel even
went a step further and held that section 1677(5)(F) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is itself
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement because it requires the U.S. Department of Com-
merce to apply a methodology where the benefit from a prior financial contribution is
not systematically found to be eliminated solely by virtue of an arm's length sale for fair
market value privatization.
The United States had argued in the first case that nothing about the sale of a corpo-
ration's stock did anything to eliminate the market distortion caused by the subsidy-the
same steel was made on the same subsidized equipment, with the same subsidized lower
debt load, and the same workers benefiting from subsidized training, etc., the day before
and after the privatization. There, the AB chose to ignore the market distortion and ad-
monished that the current producer must be shown to have received a benefit. Thus, in the
second case, the United States reasoned that if the post-sale entity was the same person
that had originally received the subsidy (in terms of general business operations, production
facilities, assets and liabilities, and personnel, for example), then the AB's requirement was
met.", The United States stressed that this interpretation was consistent with basic doc-
trines of successor liability in corporate law applied universally in developed and developing
nations-without which regulatory liability for environmental or health and safety harm
108. Report of the Panel on Hot-Rolled Lead, supra note 78, 6.76. The panel did not explain how this
refusal comported with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, which provides that a treaty' shall be interpreted in accordance with "the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context."
109. See Report of the Appellate Body on Hot-Rolled Lead, supra note 79, 9 60.
110. Report of the Panel on Certain Products from the European Communities, supra note 105.
111. Report of the Appellate Body on Certain Products from the European Communities, supra note 105,
9] 22-24.
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violations could be easily avoided-and that there was absolutely no indication that the
SCM intended to deviate from such principles. "z The AB, however, relying only on pro-
visions of the SCM Agreement dealing with the conduct of administrative reviews, rejected
the U.S. argument."
3
In doing so, the AB promulgated a new rule under which it must be assumed that a sale
of a company at fair market value "usually" extinguishes the remaining part of a benefit
bestowed by a non-recurring financial contribution."1 The AB simply invented the follow-
ing standard, and baldly asserts: "This is an accurate characterization of a Member's obli-
gations under the SCM Agreement" without citing any provision of the SCM Agreement in
support:
We understand the Panel to be stating that privatization at arm's length and for fair market
value privatization presumptively extinguishes any benefit received from the non-recurring fi-
nancial contribution bestowed upon a state-owned firm. The effect of such a privatization is
to shift to the investigating authority the burden of identifying evidence which establishes that
the benefit from the previous financial contribution does indeed continue beyond privatization.
In the absence of such proof, the fact of the arm's-length, fair market value privatization is
sufficient to compel a conclusion that the "benefit" no longer exists for the privatized firm,
and, therefore, that countervailing duties should not be levied."
Tellingly, the EC's own state aids rules make clear that privatization does nothing to the
actionability of subsidies; prior subsidies are deemed as automatically continuing, in full, to
the benefit of the purchaser." 6 Moreover, the history of the adoption of EC CVD regula-
tions to implement the Uruguay Round demonstrates that privatizations do not change the
countervailability of prior subsidies.11 Clearly this was the U.S. understanding at the time:
Section 771(5)(F) is being added to clarify that the sale of a firm at arm's-length does not
automatically, and in all cases, extinguish any prior subsidies conferred. Absent this clarification,
some might argue that all that would be required to eliminate any countervailing duty liability
would be to sell subsidized productive assets to an unrelated party. Consequently, it is imper-
ative that the implementing bill correct and prevent such an extreme interpretation."'
Such contemporaneous action by both the EC and the United States is further evidence
of the meaning of the SCM terms.",9 This evidence, too, was completely ignored by two
WATO panels and two Appellate Body decisions.'20 Finally, in the context of China's acces-
sion to the WTO, the EC insisted on limiting China's rights to claim the protection of
article 27.13.'"' This clearly indicates the EC's understanding that pre-privatization sub-
sidies continue to be actionable. Again, this was simply ignored by the DSB.
i12. Id. 8.1(d).
113. Id. 1 147.
114. Id. 1$ 126-27, 158.
115. Id. 9 126.
116. Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty, 1997 OJ. (C
283)2.
117. AISI Submission, supra note 107, 1 148.
118. SAA, supra note 43, at 928.
119. Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, i155 U.N.T.S. 331.
120. See Report of the Panel on Hot-Rolled Lead, supra note 78; Report of the Appellate Body on Hot-
Rolled Lead, supra note 79; Report of the Panel on Certain Products from the European Communities, supra
note 105; Report of the Appellate Body on Certain Products from the European Communities, supra note 105.
121. Oral Statement of the European Communities to the First Meeting of the Panel, United States-
Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, \VT/DS212, 117 (Feb. 19,
2002), available at http://mkaccdb.eu.int/dsu/doc/ds212-oral-stat.doc.
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With respect to the issue of whether the statute, as such, violated the SCM Agreement,
the AB nominally sided with the United States, noting that section 1677(5)(F) does not
"automatically" require the Commerce Department to take action it found to be inconsis-
tent with VTO rules."'2 This is a curious "victory," however. The legislative history of the
statutory provision, and the Administration's repeated statements in court about its mean-
ing, make clear that the AB's decision is wholly inconsistent with the statute.2 ' Yet, by
seeming to uphold the statute, the AB was able to strike down a large number of U.S. cases
while seeking to avoid congressional oversight.
Whatever the merits of treating subsidies after a privatization, 24 the issue properly pre-
sented is whether the Members agreed to cease countervailing in such a circumstance given
the terms of the code. Again, setting aside the obvious legal errors, it is simply fantasy to




Recently, a panel held that the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
(CDSOA), also known as the Byrd Amendment after its chief Senate co-sponsor, violates
the WTO's antidumping and subsidy rules. 1"6 CDSOA provides a mechanism by which
injured U.S. producers, who supported a petition for imposition of countervailing or anti-
dumping duties, can obtain a share of any final duties properly collected to cover "qualifying
expenses," for example, investments made after imposition of duties. This provision has
been vilified by U.S. trading partners as artificially encouraging the filing of cases (a prop-
osition utterly without factual support12 7).
122. Id. T 159.
123. See AISI Submission, sapra note 107.
124. Practically, undergoing a change in ownership does nothing to remove the benefit enjoyed by a com-
pany that has received a subsidy nor to offset nor diminish the deleterious market distortion caused by the
subsidization itself. AISI Submission, supra note 107, 5. More to the point, the privatization ruling has
essentially created a loophole in the existing IVTO anti-subsidy regime and subverted disciplines which were
supposed to have been secured, not discarded, in the Uruguay Round. The U.S. position is economically and
philosophically consistent with the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement-to offset the trade distorting
impact of subsidies. On the other hand, the panel had to ignore the object and purpose of the SCM agreement,
spending a mere three short paragraphs on the topic and making only the observation that "countervailing
duties are not designed to counteract all market distortions or resource misallocations which might have been
caused by subsidization." Report of the Panel on Certain Products from the European Communities, supra
note 105, i 7.42 (emphasis added). Of course, the fact that countervailing duties did not correct "all" market
distortions is a preposterous basis on which to treat the avowed purpose essentially as irrelevant.
125. Significantly, a substantial majority of U.S. countervailing duty investigations since adoption of the
Uruguay Round involve a change in ownership. To say that Congress intended to adopt an agreement that
eliminated those cases is, on its face, ridiculous.
Indicative of the sad state of WTO dispute settlement, rather than focusing on the merits, apparently a
major issue before the Appellate Body in this case was the treatment to be provided to the amicus brief filed by
the American Iron and Steel Institute. See discussion below.
126. See Daniel Pruzin et al., WTO Panel Shoots Down Byrd Amendment in Preliminary Ruling, Urges Straight
Repeal, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) (July 18, 2002). An Appellate Body decision in the matter is now due
on January 20, 2003, after this article will be completed but prior to its anticipated publication.
127. Reportedly, Canada cited a letter from Dewey Ballantine LLP to U.S. lumber companies, which ob-
served that under CDSOA, petitioners might recover money if duties were imposed and upheld. See id. (State-
usent of Canada's International Trade Minister, Pierre Pettigrew). Canada's claim that this proves thatCDSOA
artificially encourages litigation is ridiculous. First, the cited letter was certainly accurate and simply a necessary
warning as to the implications of participating in a case; failure to have provided this information would have
VOL. 37, NO. 3
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 725
In fact, there seems little doubt that had the idea of CDSOA been brought up during
the Uruguay Round, U.S. trading partners would have opposed it on the grounds that
petitioners must not be provided an additional incentive to file cases. It may be just as likely
that the U.S. Administration, had the issue arisen at that time, would have agreed, and the
practice would have been prohibited.
Yet, the topic did not arise in the Uruguay Round, and the idea was novel when adopted
in 2000. Whatever the merits of the provision, it cannot be said that the parties agreed that
this is impermissible-they never discussed it (nor anything like it). The codes simply do
not address the issue. As far as the codes are concerned, there is nothing that would prevent
the President of the United States and Congress from awarding every petitioner in every
case with a Freedom Medal, a free dinner, or a night in the Lincoln Bedroom to encourage
U.S. citizens to enforce U.S. rights under the WTO against unfair trade.
Thus, legally, the U.S. trading partners' remedies should have been either to seek an
amendment to WTO rules that would prohibit such activity, to claim that the funds paid
out were an actionable subsidy, or to adopt parallel provisions in their own laws. But with
binding and activist dispute settlement, in full faith and reliance on the Geneva Platonic
Guardians, such legal action was unnecessary to attack a law that was highly unpopular
internationally. Few cases perhaps better demonstrate the cynicism with which the DSB
has been used to create new standards.
The panel based its decision on the concept of prohibiting double remedies articulated
in United States-Anti-Dumping Act of1916.I2 In that case, the Appellate Body asserted that
the 1916 Act was inconsistent with the article VI because it provided additional punishments
for dumpers:
Article VI, and, in particular, Article VI:2, read in conjunction with the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment, limit the permissible responses to dumping to definitive anti-dumping duties, provisional
measures and price undertakings. Therefore, the 1916 Act is inconsistent with Article VI:2
and the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the extent that it provides for 'specific action against
dumping' in the form of civil and criminal proceedings and penalties.1
29
While one could certainly take issue with the Appellate Body's decision in that case, the
principle, at least, is clear, and it makes no sense whatsoever to apply it to the CDSOA.
The Byrd Amendment provides only that disposition of lawfully collected U.S. duties (i.e.,
taxes) be made to particular U.S. producers. It dictates no additional punishment of any
kind on imports or foreign producers; it simply mandates that the U.S. government spend
some of its own funds on industries that have been hurt by injurious and W/TO-inconsistent
behavior of other nations. 130
been objectionable. Second, it is highly questionable to claim that the prospect of some recovery five to seven
years in the future (after successful litigation, appeals, administrative review, and appeal) is a substantial factor
in motivating bringing of an expensive and time-consuming case against injurious and unfair trade with far
from a guarantee of success. Third, it is perhaps uniquely absurd to say that this was a significant factor in
motivating the lumber litigation-the fourth in a series of cases intended to address unfair Canadian lumber
trade. The level of industry support in each case has been massive and relatively unchanged. How this provides
evidence that CDSOA artificially encouraged litigation is unclear. In any case, as explained below, even if
CDSOA does encourage U.S. parties to enforce their WTO tights, nothing in the codes prohibits such actions.
128. Report of the Appellate Body, United States Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, VT/DS136/AB/R, VT/
DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000), available at 2000 VVTO DS LEXIS 37.
129. Id. T 137.
130. For example, in the ongoing U.S./Canada lumber dispute, the Canadian government recently author-
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Of course, trading partners could have claimed that CDSOA is a subsidy to particular
industries, and Mexico did so in the case.' 3 ' The problem is that it is not an actionable
subsidy as the panel has determined, and calling it a subsidy would be no basis to demand
its elimination.
132
Even if one could show that the Byrd Amendment encouraged filing of cases (a highly
dubious claim), this only encourages domestic industries to protect their rights by filing
legitimate antidumping and countervailing duty petitions (only legitimate petitions would
garner industry money)-rights the WTO specifically recognizes. Striking down what is
essentially a domestic spending program on these grounds is not a proper interpretation of
the negotiated agreements, and goes far beyond the matters that panels and the Appellate
Body should be considering.
As Senator Byrd has noted:
The VVTO has decided that it-and not the U.S. Congress-has the authority to determine
how American tax dollars are spent... [this] ruling flies in the face of the authority of Congress
to determine how funds, that are collected under the laws of the United States, should be
used.'3 3
This cannot be characterized as squabbling over the meaning of a "particular word or
provision," in the words of Appellate Body member Bacchus. It is more accurate to say this
decision created a new obligation for WTO Members. Given the nature of international
law, such "judicial activism" is wrong. Furthermore, it undermines a WTO system depen-
dent on good faith bargaining and the belief that Members will live up to the negotiated
agreements. If Members believe that the concessions for which they have negotiated are
meaningless, there is less incentive to participate.
H. SAFEGUARDS
The support of domestic business communities worldwide for GATT and the WTO was
buttressed by the Safeguards provision, also known as the Escape Clause, contained in
article XIX of the GATT 1947. Article XIX provides Members with an opportunity for
relatively quick short-term relief from imports that are causing or threatening "serious
ized Cdn$247 million in additional subsidies to employees allegedly injured by the duties and for community
adjustment. John Greenwood, B.C. slams softwood aid: $247 million package: B.C. government, labor criticize help
to softwood industry, NAT'L POST, Oct. 9, 2002. In the abstract, it is certainly Canada's right to do so. Yet, could
the United States claim that such actions "nullify and impair" the effect of the trade offsets, thereby themselves
creating another violation
It should also be noted that there are no adverse trade effects involved in the CDSOA. The United States
should, in fact, simply ignore the ruling and offer to pay compensation to "aggrieved" parties, provided that
they prove adverse trade effects. Cf. Robert Z. Lawrence, Crimes and Punishment? An Analysis of Retaliation
under the WTO (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the authors) (discussing the importance of maintaining
the trade effects standard for dispute settlement remedies).
131. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS234/13, $ 2.3 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at 2001 WL 929404 (W.T.O.).
132. See Report of the Panel, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy OffsetAct of2000, WT/DS217/
R, T 7.133 (Sept. 16, 2002), available at 2002 WL 30198108 (W.T.O.).
133. Press Release, Byrd Blasts WVTO Ruling as Undermining Congressional Authority (July 17, 2002), at
http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd-newsroom/byrd-news-july2002/rls-july 2O02/rls-july2002_8.htm.
VOL. 37, NO. 3
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 727
injury" to a domestic industry."4 From 1947 through May 1993, the escape clause was used
151 times."' It was clearly a well-recognized, legitimate tool of trade policy, and GATT
dispute resolution bodies failed to strike any of the seven safeguards measures challenged
between 1948 and 1989.136 Yet, not a single safeguard measure challenged under the WTO
Dispute Settlement has managed to survive the scrutiny of the panels and the Appellate
Body, which does not give the domestic investigating authorities any significant deference.
This is a very different approach to a very complex and technical area of trade law in
which the GATT dispute panels traditionally, and properly, gave considerable deference to
national authorities. In the Women's Fur Felt Hats and Hat Bodies GATT case, the Working
Party discussed this deference at length:
the available data support the view that increased imports had caused or threatened some
adverse effect to United States producers. Whether such a degree of adverse effect should be
considered to amount to "serious injury" is another question, on which the data cannot be said
to point convincingly in either direction, and any view on which is essentially a matter of
economic and social judgment involving a considerable subjective element.... [T]he Working
Party naturally could not have the facilities available to the United States authorities for ex-
amining interested parties and independent witnesses from the United States hat-making areas,
and for forming judgments on the basis of such examination.... Moreover, the United States
is not called upon to prove conclusively that the degree of injury caused or threatened in this
case must be regarded as serious; since the question under consideration is whether or not they
are in breach of Article XMX, they are entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt.'
The transition to WTO from GATT did not remove the protections of article XIX,
although a new detailed Agreement on Safeguards was adopted." 8 Yet, amazingly, twelve
safeguard measures have been challenged in the WTO, and all have been found to be
illegal."39 The recent decisions by the panels and the Appellate Body have eviscerated article
134. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
135. JEFFREYJ. ScHorr, THE URUGUAY RoUND: AN AsSESSMErT 94 (1994).
136. The only adopted report is United States-Fur Hats and Hat Bodies; Report of the Working Party, Report
on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tarifi
and Trade, GATT/CP/106 (Mar. 27, 1951), available at 1951 \VL 7547 (G.A.T.T.) [hereinafter United States-
Fur Hats]. In another case, although the GATT panel struck down the safeguard action, it did so solely on the
grounds that the initiating country had failed to assign a quota on the affected product to one of the Members,
thus using the safeguard in a discriminatory fashion. See Report of the Panel, Norway-Restrictions on Imports
of Certain Textile Products, U4959-27S/119 (Mar. 24, 1980), available at 1980 \WL 131241 (G.A.T.T.).
137. United States-Fur Hats, supra note 136, 30.
138. Agreement on Safeguards, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, 273 (1994).
139. These cases are as follows: Report of the Panel, United States- Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India, WAT/DW33/R (Jan. 6, 1997); Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on
Import of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, \\rW'/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997); Report of the Panel, Eu-
ropean Communities: Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/R (Dec. 3, 1998);
Report of the Panel, Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/R
(June 21, 1999), available at 1999 WTO DS LEXIS 13 [hereinafter Korea-Daiiy], Report of the Panel, Ar-
gentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WTIDS 12 I/R (June 25, 1999), available at 1999 WTO DS
LEXIS 10 [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear], Report of the Panel, United States-Definitive SafeguardMeasures
on Imports of Wheat Gluten From European Communities, WT/DSI66/R (July 31, 2000), available at 2000 \'ITO
DS LEXIS 55 [hereinafter United States-Wheat Gluten]; Report of the Panel, United States-SafeguardMeasures
on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat From New Zealand and Australia, \VT/DS 177/R, WT/DS 178/
R (Dec. 21, 2000), available at 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 27 [hereinafter United States-Lamb]; Report of the
Panel, United States-Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yardfrom Pakistan, \VT/DS/192/R(May
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XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, which the Members expected to be legitimate policy
tools to be used in some circumstances.
Some commentators have seen these negative rulings as guidelines for Member govern-
ments in carefully formulating future safeguard actions.140 Yet, in reality, they have intro-
duced draconian requirements that impose such a heavy burden of proof on national au-
thorities that they are unlikely to ever be able to satisfy it. Part of the problem lies in the
failure of panels to provide adequate deference to the foundational provisions of the GATT
1947. In the case of safeguards, the precise relationship between article XIX of the GATT
and the new Agreement on Safeguards was not made explicit by the Parties, but under the
Interpretative Note adopted at the establishment of the WTO, "[iun the event of conflict
between a provision of the GATT 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex IA
to the Agreement Establishing the WTO ... , the provisions of the other agreement shall
prevail to the extent of the conflict.' 141
Such a conflict arose in regard to the requirement of "unforeseen developments," which
was present in article XIX but not in the newly negotiated Agreement on Safeguards. It is
likely that if the Members wanted to maintain the "unforeseen development" requirement
of article XIX, they would have included it in the far more elaborate and detailed Agreement
on Safeguards, which, after all, reiterates all other major provisions of article XIX. They
did not do so, thus creating an apparent conflict of laws between article XIX and the Agree-
ment on Safeguards.
The panel in Argentina-Footwear determined that the Agreement on Safeguards "should
be understood as defining, clarifying, and in some cases modifying" obligations under article
XIX. 4 The panel in Korea-Dairy reached a similar conclusion.143 Yet, the Appellate Body
in Korea-Dairy decided instead that requirements of article XIX and the Agreement on
Safeguards were cumulative because:
The ordinary meaning of the language in Article 11.1(a)-"unless such action conforms with
the provisions of that Article applied in accordance with this Agreement"-is that any safeguard
action must conform with the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 as well as with the
provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.- 4
The Appellate Body thus raised the bar on safeguard measures in a way that does not appear
to have been intended by the Parties.
31, 2001) [hereinafter United States-Cotton Yarn]; Report of the Panel, United States-Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea, WT/DS202/R (Oct. 29, 2001),
available at 2001 WTO DS LEXIS 36; Report of the Panel, Chile-Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, VT/DS207/R (May 3, 2002), available at 2002 XVTO DS LEXIS 24;
Report of the Panel, Argentina-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches, VT/DS238/R
(Feb. 14, 2003); Report of the Panel, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products, \VT/DS248/R, \\VT/DS249/R, \\rT/DS2 5 I/R, X\rF/DS252/R, \VT/DS253/R, kArT/DS254/R, V T/
DS258/R, WTF/DS/259/R (July 11, 2003). The U.S. safeguard action on steel is currently under review. Again,
the decision will likely be issued by the time this article is published.
140. Robert Rogowsky, WTO Disputes: Building International Law on Safeguards, VA. LAW. INT'L L. SEC.,
June/July 2001, at 6; Gillian Triggs, Analysis #9, W7O Rules Against U.S. Restrictions on Australian Lamb,
University of Melbourne Law School, at http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/icil/topics/a-archive/9-8-6-Ol.html.
141. General Interpretive Note to Annex IA, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144-53.
142. Argentina-Footwear, supra note 139, T 8.58 (emphasis in original).
143. Korea-Dairy, supra note 139, 'I 7.43-7.48.
144. Id. ' 77.
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In Argentina-Footwear, the Appellate Body again engaged in legislating, ruling that the
"language in both Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX: 1 (a) of the
GATT 1994, we believe, requires that the increase in imports must have been recent
enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause 'serious injury."' 45 The requirements of sud-
denness and sharpness are entirely new; in fact, neither GATI article XIX nor the Agree-
ment on Safeguards, referred to by the Appellate Body, includes the words "sharp" or
"sudden." The Appellate Body, forgetting yet again its obligations under DSU article 3.2,
created two new obligations for WTO Members in adopting safeguards measures.
The United States-Lamb case is another good illustration. The United States-Lamb
panel found that the U.S. International Trade Commission acted inconsistently with Article
XIX: 1(a) by not finding that injury resulted from an "unforeseen development." The United
States had argued, quite reasonably, that nothing in GA'TT article XIX required that the
domestic authority explicitly consider and publish a decision on "unforeseen develop-
ments." 146 Ignoring a prior panel opinionl47 (not overturned by an Appellate Body ruling),
and the plain absence of such a requirement on the face of the Agreement on Safeguards,
the panel in United States-Lamb ruled that the national authority had to make an explicit
determination of unforeseen circumstances in order to comply with WTO obligations. 148
Controversially, the panel relied in its decision on an unadopted GATT report, Canada-
Beef while going against some adopted ones. 149
Even if one accepts that conclusion, the question remains: What to do about it? Although
the ITC did not explicitly find "unforeseen circumstances" (probably in part because it,
and at least one other panel, saw no such specific requirement in the WTO Agreements or
article XLX), the statistics it collected and analyzed imply such a finding. Yet, the panel
moved on to determine that "USITC statements ... are simple descriptive statements, and
cannot be construed as a conclusion as to the existence of 'unforeseen developments' in the
sense of GAT'T Article XIX:I."' 0 In essence, the panel did not deny that the developments
were unforeseen, but instead created a new requirement of such an explicit determination
by the national authority and then examined and "flunked" ITC's determination based on
this brand new requirement.
The pattern of refusing to accord deference to domestic authorities in charge of the
investigations, inconsistent with the GATT precedent, continued in Korea-Dairy Products,
where the AB stated for the first time that it was necessary, although not sufficient, for the
investigating authorities to evaluate eight factors listed in article 4.2(a) of the Safeguards
Agreement' and include all that information in notification to the WTO.'1 In United
States--Wheat Gluten, the panel went further and required that all relevant factors enu-
merated in the Agreement on Safeguards, and all other relevant factors "that are clearly
145. Argentina-Footwear, supra note 139, 9 131.
146. United States-Lamb, supra note 139, $ 7.26.
147. Argentina Foonear, supra note 139, 9 8.58.
148. United States-Lamb, supra note 139, 9 7.31.
149. Id. 1 7.95.
150. Id. 9 7.43.
151. These are: rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product in absolute and relative terms;
share of domestic market taken by increased imports; changes in the level of sales, production, productivity,
capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment.
152. Korea-Dairy, supra note 139, 9 111.
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raised before them as relevant by the interested parties in the domestic investigation [s],"
be expressly evaluated and discussed.11 Yet, the Appellate Body felt compelled to raise the
plank higher. In reviewing United States-Wheat Gluten, the Appellate Body stated that
national authorities must fully investigate all relevant factors, as selected by those national
authorities themselves, regardless of whether the issue had been brought up by the parties
involved so long as there is a chance it might be relevant.54 This is an extremely demanding
requirement upon agencies with limited staffing and resources, especially for nations smaller
than the United States or European Community. Although it appears to give considerable
discretion to the national authorities in selecting additional factors to be considered, there
is no evidence that the discretion came with any greater deference from the panels. Without
providing any precise guidelines on how relevant or imminent a factor must be, the Ap-
pellate Body left itself broad leeway to strike down future safeguard measures. Little trace
of deference seems to be left at the WTO and certainly not in the field of safeguards.
Unfortunately, one suspects that by the time this article is in print, there will be other
examples. Moreover, similar problems exist in areas involving matters other than unfair
trade remedies. The point is that panels and the Appellate Body have become activists and
certainly are not abiding by the standard international legal admonition of non liquet.
III. The Dispute Settlement System's Procedural
Deficiencies Contribute to the System's Failures
The binding nature of the DSU-and the tendency of panels and the Appellate Body to
constructively expand the negotiated agreements-would not be as troubling if effective
procedural controls were in place to provide transparent and fair access and due process
that is expected of a court. If the W TO is to retain its apparent status as a "world court"
for trade, appropriate steps must be taken to protect the rights of parties-in-interest. As
one trade scholar noted, procedural justice is essential because of the
important function it performs in assisting an adjudicatory body [to] reach a decision or res-
olution of the dispute. Procedural justice facilitates the effective conduct of the adjudication,
provides sufficient fact-gathering opportunities..., and thereby enables a tribunal to provide
a well-reasoned and just adjudication of the controverted claims.'5"
In other words, an effective procedural framework does more than just protect the rights of
litigants, it also enables a judicial body to both consider more effectively the legal problems at
issue in a dispute, and develop the law in a rational and appropriate manner. Unfortunately,
the absence of adequate procedural safeguards is also beginning to take a serious toll and
encourage inappropriate, and sometimes simply erroneous, decisions.
A. MANDATE TO DECIDE ACTUAL DISPUTES
In practice, XVTO dispute settlement lacks basic jurisdictional limitations that restrain
judicial activism. Specifically, the lack of clear standing, mootness, or ripeness doctrines
153. United States-Wheat Gluten, supra note 139, 1 8.69.
154. Report of the Appellate Body, Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wlheat Gluten from the European
Communities, VT/DSI66/AB/R, J 55 (Dec. 22, 2000), availableat 2000 IVTO DS LEXIS 41.
155. Gaffney, supra note 25, at 1185 (footnotes omitted). Gaffney further explains that the need for pro-
cedural protections has arisen out of "the undoubted movement from the 'power oriented' GAIT approach
to a 'rule oriented' WVTO system." Id. See infra section IV.
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means that a WTO Member can bring a case despite having nothing immediately at stake
in its outcome. Such a practice encourages litigation in the abstract, with advisory opinions
particularly apt to "make new law." It also runs counter to the purpose of WVTO dispute
settlement-to secure a positive solution to a particular dispute. s 6 The Appellate Body
explained as follows:
[T]he basic aim of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes.... Given the explicit
aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the
DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to "make law" by clarifying
existing provisions of the W"TO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dis-
pute. A panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the
matter in issue in the dispute.'57
Yet, recent WTO rulings suggest that panels and the Appellate Body may not be content
to limit their decisions to the resolution of actual disputes between adverse parties that
present real consequences. 5 ' In this regard, the Appellate Body (AB) in EC-Bananas spe-
cifically found that the DSU does not have a "legal interest" threshold requirement. 5 9 As
Peter Lichtenbaum notes: "If there is no standing requirement at all, there is a risk that
panels will be presented with abstract disputes about the interpretation of particular WTO
agreements and will not have the benefit of specific facts needed to determine the correct
result. "1160
At least one AB member has insisted that there are limits on the issues decided in dispute
settlement, declaring: "We address only those issues that are raised on appeal. We rule only
on what is necessary to resolve the dispute on appeal. ' ' 16 The first factor has proved not to
be a serious impediment and avoids the fact that substantive restrictions on jurisdiction and
adjudication (e.g., standing, "political questions," advisory opinions, etc.) must of necessity
arise with the "court." As to the AB's alleged forbearance, the AB's actions speak louder
than its words. For example, little more than two weeks after the speech insisting that the
AB limit its decisions to matters "necessary" for resolution, in a case involving the sunset
review of countervailing duties on German flat-rolled steel, the AB went out of its way to
pontificate on issues that were not presented by the parties or by the appeal. The AB noted
expressly that, "no issues relating to the injury determination are raised in this case,"'' 6 but
stated anyway:
156. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art.
3.7, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INsTRUMENTs -REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 31 (1999), 33
I.L.M. 114, 115 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
157. Report of the Appellate Body, United States Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
fiom India, \rF/DS33/AB/R, at *45 (Apr. 25, 1997), available at 1997 '1 TO DS LEXIS 2.
158. For example, recently, the \NTO issued its report in Report of the Panel, United States-Preliminary
Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, \.\r/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002), available
at 2002 'NrL 31151699 (XV.T.O.), notwithstanding the fact that any duties imposed by the preliminary deter-
minations had already been refunded to Canadian exporters as a result of the International Trade Commission's
determination that lumber from Canada did not cause actual injury during the period of investigation.
159. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, \VT/DS27/AB/R, 1 133 (Sept. 9, 1997), available at 1997 V-TO DS LEXIS 27.
160. Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 Mcri.J. INT'L L. 1195, 1211 (1998).
161. Bacchus, supra note 43, at 12.
162. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon
Steel Flat Productsfrom Germany, W'TIDS213/ABIR, $ 88 n.82 (Nov. 28, 2002), available at 2002 WL 31670105
(V.T.O.).
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At the same time, we wish to underline the thrust of Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement. An
automatic time-bound termination of countervailing duties that have been in place for five
years from the original investigation or a subsequent comprehensive review is at the heart of
this provision. Termination of a countervailing duty is the rule and its continuation is the
exception. The continuation of a countervailing duty must therefore be based on a properly
conducted review and a positive determination that the revocation of the countervailing duty
would "be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury." Where the
level of subsidization at the time of the review is very low, there must be persuasive evidence
that revocation of the duty would nevertheless lead to injury to the domestic industry. Mere
reliance by the authorities on the injury determination made in the original investigation will
not be sufficient. Rather, a fresh determination, based on credible evidence, will be necessary
to establish that the continuation of the countervailing duty is warranted to remove the injury
to the domestic industry.163
Similar advisory opinions have been issued in other cases, as discussed further below.
The lack of a requirement that a genuine legal issue be present is even more troublesome
given the erosion of the few self-imposed jurisdictional limitations to which panels have
adhered. An illustrative example is the recent undermining of the mandatory/discretionary
distinction. WTO cases provide that if a national law is discretionary, such that a WTO
violation is not mandated by the legislation, panels should refrain from considering the
WATO-consistency of the law unless the discretionary power had been exercised and an
actual violation had occurred. - On its face, the mandatory/discretionary doctrine provides
at least one mechanism for restraining panels from opining on matters not germane to a
genuine dispute.
Yet, in United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, the panel turned the
mandatory/discretionary doctrine on its head. Canada brought a WTO claim against the
United States, arguing that U.S. countervailing duty law and "practice" mandated that an
export restraint be treated as a countervailing subsidy, which, according to Canada, was
contrary to the SCM Agreement. The claim proceeded under WTO dispute settlement
rules notwithstanding the fact that there were no countervailing duties in place against any
export restraint regime. 6 1 While properly dismissing Canada's complaint as premature,
based on the mandatory/discretionary doctrine, the panel nevertheless wrongly saw fit to
issue an abstract opinion on the circumstances in which an export restraint may constitute
an indirect subsidy under the SCM Agreement. The panel attempted to justify its decision
to discuss the substantive arguments of the parties on the basis that such an analysis was
necessary to determine the mandatory/discretionary question:
[l]dentifying and addressing the relevant VITO obligations first will facilitate our assessment
of the manner in which the legislation addresses those obligations, and whether any violation
is involved. That is, it is after we have considered both the substance of the claims in respect
of WVTO provisions and the relevant provisions of the legislation at issue that we will be in
163. Id. 1 88 (footnote, noting that the issue was not presented, omitted).
164. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by the European
Communities, VT/DS 136/R (Mar. 31, 2000), available at 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 63.
165. Indeed, at the time Canada brought the WTO complaint, the United States was prohibited by inter-
national agreement from imposing countervailing duties based on Canada's export restrictions on logs used to
make softwood lumber.
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the best position to determine whether the legislation requires a treatment of export restraints
that violates those provisions.'
This is ridiculous: If the provision is not mandatory, as the panel ultimately found, the
substantive question is irrelevant.
167
The panel's discussion amounted to an "advisory opinion" as there was no current dis-
pute, let alone an actual VVTO violation. 16 Even more clearly than in other cases, given its
decision that Canada's complaint was in any event premature, the panel blatantly sought
to legislate by articulating new obligations for VITO Members without their consent and
without an actual dispute to resolve.
Thankfully, an even more recent panel has disavowed the reasoning in Export Restraints.
For instance, in United States--Section 129, the panel stated:
We note that the Panel in [Export Restraints] first considered whether certain action was in
conformity with VeTO requirements and only then addressed whether the measure at issue
mandated such action.... [W]e do not see how addressing first whether certain actions iden-
tified by Canada would contravene particular WTO provisions would facilitate our assessment
of whether section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to take certain action or not to take
certain action. 16 9
Nevertheless, the report in Export Restraints demonstrates the need to develop jurisdictional
doctrines in VTO dispute setdement such as standing, mootness, and justiciability in order
for the DSB to stay true to its mandate.
The DSB also has no way of recognizing a given dispute as not being suited to resolution
through litigation, the equivalent of the "political question" doctrine in domestic law or
strict application of the doctrine of non liquet. For example, the United States might well
have argued that the WTO DSB was not the proper forum to resolve the problems con-
cerning the U.S. FSC law.170 Similarly, the EC might have argued that Beef Hormones was
not an appropriate decision for panel resolution. (Arguably, it was application of such a
doctrine that ultimately led the EC not to press its claim on Helms-Burton.) The funda-
mental point is that the WTO was not set up to dictate nations' tax policies. Yet in United
States-FSC, the panel and the Appellate Body effectively curtailed the authority of the
U.S. government to make tax policy.
166. Report of the Panel, United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, VT/DS194/R,
8.12 (June 29, 2001), available at 2001 WTO DS LEXIS 21.
167. Id. 1 8.77-8.132.
168. It should be noted that the panel's dicta is not nearly as substantively far-reaching as some have claimed.
For instance, the opinion considers only export restraints as that term had been defined very narrowly by
Canada in the litigation. Id. 19 8.16-8.17. WvVhile the opinion was heavily criticized by the United States, it was
not the subject of an appeal, as Canada's case was dismissed. In any case, however, the matter should simply
have been dismissed without a substantive discussion.
169. Report of the Panel, United States--Section 129(c) (1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,VT/DS2 21I/
R, art. 6.25 n.7 2 (July 15, 2002), available at 2002 WTO DS LEXIS 30.
170. Accepting for the sake of argument that the FSC program does represent an export subsidy, the United
States had reason to believe that it had reached an understanding with the EU regarding it being an exception
from the trade rules. The case has a long and complex history. See Hearing on the WTO's Extraterritorial
Income Decision Before the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Peter
Davidson, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative); see, e.g., Cecilia B. Skeen, Knick
Knack Paddy Whack Leave the FSC Alone: An Analysis of the 1/TO Panel Ruling That the U.S. Foreign Sales
Corporation Program is an Illegal Export Subsidy Under GATT, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 69 (2000).
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B. RIGHT OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST TO PARTICIPATE
At the heart of the fairness of any adjudicatory process is the right of real parties in
interest to participate in the proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has succinctly explained
the basis for this principle:
[T]here are persons who are merely formal parties without real interest, and there are those
who have an interest in the suit, but which will not be injured by the relief sought, and there
are those whose interest in the subject-matter of the suit renders them indispensable as parties
to it.. . . [T]his later class ... [consists of] "persons who not only have an interest in the
controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting
that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final disposition may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience."'
Under the old GATT system, with limited substantive rules, the ability of a sovereign
nation to block the adoption of a rule or a panel decision and the clearly non-binding nature
of panel decisions, it was understood that only Members were parties in interest. The cases
included major elements of negotiations. Yet, with the expansion of the substantive rules at
issue, their particularity, the binding nature of WTO dispute settlement, and the undeniable
direct impact of WTO decisions on important commercial interests, this fiction can no
longer be maintained.'
Even at the most basic level, unless private parties are provided a right to observe and
access WTO proceedings, there is no way of ensuring that their interests are appropriately
represented by participating government officials.
If WTO panels are to issue binding rulings, real parties in interest have the same need
for access that they have in domestic adjudicatory settings. Absent these parties, decisions
and arguments can be made based upon concerns that go well beyond the relevant legal
question at issue or that fail to fully and adequately address key concerns. Assuming one
accepts that WTO dispute settlement operates as an adjudicatory system, as opposed to a
diplomatic system, the crucial legal interpretation of a judicial or quasi-judicial body should
not be based upon other, extraneous factors, such as what might be in a nation's perceived
best interest at the time or at interest in another case in which the government is involved.' 7 '
Private parties should not be subject to binding "judicial" decisions without the opportunity
to have their day in court.'
In any case, refusal to grant a clear right to observe' 75 is utterly indefensible. If the private
parties who are affected by trade agreements cannot even observe the judicial proceedings
171. Cunningham v. Macon & B.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 456-57 (1883) (quoting Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S.
130 (1854), and Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S. 280 (1867)).
172. See generally Ragosta, supra note 2, at 746-49.
173. See Jessica C. Pearlman, Note, Participation of Private Counsel in World Trade Organization Dispute Set-
lement Proceedings, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 399, 414 n.75 (1999); see also Ragosta, supra note 2.
174. See, e.g., Young, supra note 3, at 406 ("If the goal is to depoliticize completely the dispute resolution
process, then the advantages of recognizing complaints by nonstate actors must be seriously weighed.").
175. While private lawyers are allowed to participate in the proceedings if one of the Parties' governments
retains them as part of its litigation team, private parties are not allowed to participate or observe unless they
are brought in by one of the governments. See Lichtenbaum, supra note 160, at 1203-08 (discussing the right
of Member governments to hire private counsel for representation in \VTO disputes). There is of course a
huge difference between being invited to participate in order to defend one's interests and being excluded
unless a third party (whose interests may differ drastically from your own) decides to include you.
It is particularly inappropriate that while USTR has "demanded" greater transparency in ITlO proceedings,
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from which binding pronouncements issue, pressure will mount upon national governments
not to enter into such agreements in the first place. Seattle is a prime example.
C. NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY
Another principal procedural deficiency with the DSU is its lack of transparency. This
is an ongoing issue that became a major concern after the debacle at Seattle. The Doha
Ministerial Declaration commits Ministers "to promote a better public understanding of
the VTO," and "to making the WTO's operations more transparent, including through
more effective and prompt dissemination of information." 7 6 Yet, proposals for real trans-
parency in the dispute settlement system are continually opposed by many of the Members.
Numerous proposals in this area have already been made, from opening the dispute
settlement hearings to the general public, to requiring parties to make their submissions
public (redacted, of course, for truly confidential business information).' 77 As then-
Ambassador Barshefsky explained:
[Miany people see trade policy, and especially the World Trade Organization, as opaque and
unresponsive to the public. And again, they are not entirely wrong. The trading system must
... become more open to civil society. There is no reason the interested public should be
excluded from observing dispute settlement proceedings."0
Unfortunately, efforts to increase transparency after the Uruguay Round have not been
particularly successful. If the system is going to continue to perform an adjudicatory func-
tion, it is essential to adopt judicial procedures. 7 9 Whereas a diplomatic system requires
some level of secrecy and limited access in order to encourage compromise and in recog-
nition of the extent to which the codes are "standards" more than "rules," and to protect
negotiators from public backlash, that same secrecy is destructive in a judicial environ-
ment.6 0 In such an environment, secrecy must give way to transparency in order to maintain
faith in the system.
U.S. private interests have been effectively foreclosed from even observing proceedings by USTR, while foreign
private interests are often observers.
176. Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration, WT/Min(01)/Dec/W/I (Nov. 14,
2001), ' 10, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/doha/mindec.pdf.
177. As Dean Young has noted, "the Understanding basically maintains the confidential, closed nature of
GATT dispute-resolution proceedings.... [M]any groups whose interests are immediately and directlyaffected
by GATT decisions and rulings do not find this arrangement satisfactory." Young, supra note 3, at 406; see also
Ragosta, supra note 2, at 752. Canada's position on this issue would be mildly amusing were the issue not so
important: The Canadian federal officials have spoken of their intent to push for greater transparency at the
V'TO. Pierre Pettigrew, Address to the Toronto Board of Trade on the Future of World Trade: How the
WTO Can Help Your Business (Oct. 22, 2001), at http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publica-
tion.asp?FileSpec =/Min PubDocs/104614.htm. Yet, Canada continues to maintain the utter confidentiality
of all of the briefs in the recent lumber dispute partially it would seem, to frustrate the access of its own natives
and environmentalists to effective participation in the WTO process.
178. Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Remarks Prepared for Delivery, ISAC Plenary Session (May 6, 1998),
at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/barshefsky/barshefsky-. 5.pdf.
President Clinton urged that "the WTO had been seen as a 'private priesthood for experts' and now must
open up to hear the views of diverse parties." John Burgess, Activist Group Public Citizen Joins Attack on WTO,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1999, at El (quoting 'William J. Clinton, President of the United States).
179. Young provides a relevant explanation of the difference between diplomacy and adjudication. The
former is "characterized by consultations, negotiations, and diplomatic compromises," while the latter is better
suited to "create clear-cut, binding rules or rigorous applications of the law." Young, supra note 3, at 390.
180. See Ragosta, supra note 2, at 750-51. Similarly, John Gaffncy has described the "undoubted movement
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In August 2002, the United States emphasized the need for greater transparency in dis-
pute settlement as a priority in the negotiations concerning reform of WTO dispute set-
dement rules and procedures.s l The United States properly noted that other international
fora that deal with intergovernmental issues, including the International Court of Justice,
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the European
Court of Human Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, are each
open to the public." 2 There is no reason for WTO disputes, the outcomes of which sig-
nificantly impact civil society, to be any different.
D. REAL AND CONSISTENT OPPORTUNITY FOR AMIcus BRIEFING
The DSU does not expressly provide for the submission of amicus briefs, but the Appellate
Body has determined (in U.S.-Srimp8s ) that they can be accepted. Yet, even that small
step toward legitimating a "judicial" process has engendered great controversy among
WTO Members. The reaction of WTO Members to the decision to allow amicus briefs,
as well as the decision in EC-Asbestos to issue "Additional Procedures" on amicus brief sub-
mission, is telling.18 4 Most Members complained bitterly about these developments, accus-
ing the Appellate Body of going beyond its mandate.'
The irony is telling. When panels create entirely new substantive norms restricting the
ability of the United States, the European Community, and others to defend against unfair
trade, often in contravention of the texts, not a peep of protest is heard about panels ex-
ceeding their mandate. Yet, when a simple procedural rule is created to permit panels to
better understand an issue and to provide non-government organizations with the most
minimal of opportunities to participate, there is an enormous outcry of protest. This is
hardly comparable to judicial activism on substantive norms. Greater access to a judicial
system in the form of amicus briefs, such as that created in the DSU, is desirable, and courts
and arbitral panels both domestically and internationally have always had the authority to
set their own procedural rules.'
from the 'power oriented' GATT approach to a 'rule oriented' VTO system." Gaffney, supra note 25, at 1185
(footnotes omitted).
181. U.S. Paper on Transparency Submitted for WTO Dispute Settlement Negotiations (Aug. 9, 2002), at
http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/dispute.shtml. Officials at the USTR are to be commended for their efforts
in this regard. At the same time, if that is all that is achieved in WVTO dispute settlement reform, given the
significant shortcomings of the institution, reform efforts will have come up very short.
182. Id.
183. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
XVT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at 1998 XVrTO DS LEXIS 13.
184. This was not the first time the Appellate Body addressed the issue. In Shrimp-Turtle it ruled that a
"panel has the discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice sub-
mitted to it, wbether requested by a panel or not." Id. 1 108 (emphasis in original). Yet, its decision to create a set
of rules governing amicus briefs drew particularly harsh criticism.
185. Peter C. Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the H'7O: Mucb Ado About Nothing, at htpp://
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010201 .html.
186. A good example of the latter can be found in the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law arbitration rules: "Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner
as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the
proceeding each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case." UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A.
Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL, § 1II, art. 15(1) (1976).
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Unfortunately, the procedural rules on this subject are still in dispute. In Canada-
Lumber,"s' for example, both Native Americans and environmentalists were interested in
filing arnicus briefs in support of the U.S. position. The Native Americans' brief was ac-
cepted, as it was filed at the same time as the first U.S. briefs (although their comments
were almost completely ignored). The environmentalist's brief, however, was rejected os-
tensibly on the basis of being late, despite the fact that it came two and a half weeks prior
to the second oral arguments and a month prior to final written submissions. It is ridiculous
for a panel to reject an amiaus as "late" when there are no time limits or published procedures
for its filing amicus. It is the arbitrary nature of the decision and the lack of firm procedural
rules that is so discouraging. If the Appellate Body or panels want to impose a timeframe
for amicus submissions they should do so, but panels should refrain from arbitrarily deciding
that some briefs are timely while others are late without basing that decision on a rule that
has been made known to the membership of the V7TO, or without at least providing a
reasoned basis.
A considerable amount of opposition to participation by arnici in dispute settlement pro-
ceedings has come from lesser developed countries (LDCs) on the assumption that amicus
practice, presumably by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from rich, developed
countries, would more often than not be biased against the positions of LDCs1oo This view
is ill founded. The assumption that, on balance, the wide and diverse range of non-
governmental interests would consistently espouse a particular viewpoint has hardly been
proven. NGOs from developed nations frequently take positions opposite that of their own
governments and would have less incentive to participate in dispute settlement proceedings
if their views were already accounted for. Moreover, one can anticipate greater participation
from NGOs that promote the interests of LDCs and can effectively advocate positions that
reflect the interests of their citizenry (e.g., intellectual property rights under TRIPs con-
cerning AIDS vaccines).
E. IMPROVING THE RIGHTS OF LDCs TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
Allowing private parties to represent their interests in front of WTO panels must be
accompanied by other steps designed to increase the availability of effective counsel for all
DSU disputants. The lack of availability of top-flight counsel, or ability of LDCs to pay
for such counsel, should also be addressed. Currently, the WTO Secretariat must make
"qualified legal experts" available to such countries,1 8' but those experts must maintain their
impartiality, thereby limiting the effectiveness of their advice. Moreover, they could not
possibly have adequate time to devote to representation of LDC interests in actual litigation.
A number of proposals have been offered to improve LDC participation in the WTO
dispute settlement process. Venezuela proposed the establishment of a trust fund to finance
the hiring of defense counsel to assist developing countries in dispute settlement proceed-
ings before the WTO. l - The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
187. Report of the Panel, United States-Preliminary Determinations With Respect To Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002), available at 2002 WL 31151699 (W.T.O.).
188. Ragosta, supra note 2, at 756 (citing World Wildlife Federation, REFORM OF THE WTO's DIsPTrrE
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 3 (1999)).
189. DSU, supra note 13, art. 27.2.
190. See Comments on the Review of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism by Venezuela, Feb. 24, 1998.
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recognizing the importance of the dispute settlement process to LDCs, proposed an exten-
sive training program for individuals from LDCs.' 9' Others proposed the formation of an
independent Advisory Center for LDCs. 92 The international treaty establishing the Ad-
visory Center on WTO Law (ACWL) was signed in December 1999 by ministers at the
ill-fated WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle. The ACVVL has been operational since July
2001 and has assisted a number of developing countries in their WTO dispute settlement
proceedings.193 These are important efforts that should be zealously pursued, although
Venezuela should not limit its proposal to defense counsel. After all, the inability to enforce
rights is equally deleterious to the inability to defend them.
As DSB decisions are binding, the system is undermined both by disputants' inability to
retain effective counsel and by private parties' inability to represent their interests before
the tribunal. In both cases, dispute resolution does not rely upon the best legal arguments
and presentation of the facts and litigants cannot effectively defend their own interests. This
situation is avoidable by opening the system to private-party litigants and ensuring that
effective counsel is available to LDCs.
F. IMPARTIALITY OF PANELS
The DSU's Rules of Conduct provide that a person serving on a panel or Standing
Appellate Body, including arbitrators and experts participating in dispute settlement pro-
ceedings, "shall be independent and impartial [and] shall avoid direct or indirect conflicts
of interest."' 9 The Rules of Conduct impose on such individuals "self-disclosure require-
ments" to reveal any information that may cast "justifiable doubts as to their independence
or impartiality."'' 19 Further, exparte communication with a panel or Appellate Body-albeit,
apparently not expressly with Secretariat staff-is prohibited concerning matters under
consideration. 9° Notwithstanding the importance of these procedural protections, serious
questions about conflicts of interest, representations, and unnecessary contact with Secre-
tariat officials remain.
At minimum, Members should strip WTO Secretariat officials of their current dispute
settlement functions (e.g., advising panels and helping to choose panelists).197 In more than
one instance, it has been suggested that "secretariat staff" appear to oppose a particular
position. Of course, in theory, this should be utterly irrelevant. Under the current system,
however, it is anything but. While Secretariat officials would urge that they play an
191. U.N. Agency Outlines Proposal for WTO Dispute Settlement Training, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA),
Jan. 27, 2000, at A-3.
192. Advisory Center on WTO Law Proposed As Resource for Poorer Member Nations, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
970 (June 9, 1999).
193. For a general discussion of the purposes of the ACWL, see Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center
on WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and Equality, 2 J. Irr'L EcoN. L. 723 (1999). Nonetheless, the ACXVL also
operates under a number of inappropriate restraints, particularly as to supporting complaints.
194. Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, art. II(1), WT/DSB/RC/1 (Dec. 11, 1996).
195. Id. art. VI(2).
196. VTO Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 19, VsT/AB/WP/3 (Feb. 28, 1997).
197. Professor Lowenfeld, commenting on institutional reform within the V/TO has warned: "Nothing is
said about the secretariat's role in the appellate process, and I think it is important that there be no such role."
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Comment, Remedies Along with Rights Institutional Reform in the New GATF, 88 Am. J.
INT'L L. 477, 485 (1994).
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important role in preventing panelists from even more aggressively creating new law, the
efficacy of this restraint has certainly not been demonstrated. If panels would even more
aggressively engage in judicial activism but for the Secretariat's restraint, perhaps they
should be permitted to do so, with all of the likely consequences. Alternatively, as suggested
below, effective diplomatic restraints must be placed on panels.
One way to improve the independence of the panels is to create independent clerks, as
discussed below. Over the long-term, action should also be taken to ensure a more appro-
priate balance of representation in the Secretariat.
Another seemingly small, but quite important reform to encourage impartial and quali-
fied panelists is to increase the pay of panelists so that serving on a panel is not a substantial
financial hardship for many of those best qualified. One prior panelist noted that a particu-
larly complex case required a substantial commitment of time over a six-month period, all
for the princely sum of about $12,000. While many may wish to serve on a panel for the
prestige or for the benefit of the system, creating a serious financial hardship for the best
possible panelists, who certainly have the option of collecting hundreds of dollars an hour
in consulting fees, can only impair the overall quality of the panelists. Given what is at
stake, dramatically increasing the fees paid to panelists will have little impact on the WTO's
budget, but will help to maintain and improve the quality of panelists.
G. AN INDEPENDENT AND SUFFICIENTLY STAFFED STANDING JUDICIARY
It is indeed quite remarkable that WTO Members entrust matters of such great impor-
tance-matters that are hotly debated and negotiated over many months at the most senior
levels of government-to an adjudicatory system based on ad hoc panelists. A standing ju-
diciary may seem counter-intuitive to those concerned with issues of national sovereignty,
but sovereignty issues must be addressed by panelists, and the issue is whether a standing
judiciary would be more likely to respect the limitations under which it is intended to
operate. Problems of bias and conflicts (or the appearance or suspicion of bias and con-
flicts)9 s would be dealt with more readily by a small group of judges serving a reasonable
term, and subject to approval or removal by a significant portion of the General Council.
This would improve somewhat the freedom of panel members to interpret the agreements
without fear of reprisals when they return to their native countries, although no doubt
individual panelists would inherently reserve some sense of loyalty to their homeland. These
are natural "biases"1 99 that may only be mitigated.200 While we harbor no illusions that
independent judges would solve the problems of judicial activism discussed above-indeed,
depending on the panelists, it could exacerbate the problem-if the system is to function
as adjudicatory, permanent panelists should at least be seriously considered.
It is also important that judicial panels be staffed with independent law clerks that are
not part of the regular 'NTO bureaucracy. As previously suggested, 20 a staff of law clerks
198. For anecdotes, see Ragosta, supra note 2, at 761.
199. Bias in this context is a broad issue. For instance, a panelist may come from a society where government
subsidies and intervention in the market place are very much a part of everyday life. This may tend the panelist
to lean towards excusing disciplines on injurious subsidies.
200. In the United States, the impartiality of federal judges is sought to be preserved, at least in part, by
tenure and salary protection. The notion was that federal judges could see themselves as citizens and guardians
of the United States, rather than their individual states. It is not likely that the same rationale could apply any
time in the foreseeable future to the WTO.
201. Ragosta, upra note 2, at 760-62.
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would be quite economical and would provide immense assistance in ensuring that WTO
panelists and the AB better understand the underlying legal issues and the factual circum-
stances of individual cases (both of which can be highly complex and time-consuming).
H. PUBLICATION OF DISSENTING OPINIONS
The DSU currently provides that "[planel deliberations shall be confidential" and that
"[o]pinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall be anonymous."20
The practice has developed such that panel decisions very rarely indicate any type of dis-
agreement among individual panelists, although such disagreement is reportedly quite evi-
dent at panel hearings. In fact, over fifty years of GATT and WTO jurisprudence failed to
elicit even a single dissent. This suggests only two possibilities: First, all of the issues were
so clear and straightforward, and the reasoning subject to such universal approbation, that
no panelist ever disagreed. Second, that dissent was effectively squelched by a culture (led
by the Secretariat) more concerned with diplomatic appearances and "resolution" than with
proper legal development. Of course, such a system may have been more appropriate in
the old diplomatic model of dispute settlement, but it has no place in a "world trade court."
In the W'TO, this is another important restraint on the transparency and rational legal
development of the dispute settlement process.
In domestic U.S. law, the publication of dissents plays an important function in the
development of jurisprudence. As one commentator notes: "Unanimity may have helped
to bolster the credibility of the weak, fledgling Supreme Court, but it would have been
detrimental to the legitimacy of the Court if that system had prevailed in the long run.
'20 3
Dissents often contain a philosophy that can alter the course of legislative enactment or
possibly even drive the call for a constitutional amendment.? 4 Perhaps the most notable
instance was the powerfully worded dissent by Justice Iredell in Chisholm v. Georgia,0 5 which
galvanized public opinion and led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. 0 6 justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson °7 is another example of the importance of published
dissents.
Encouragingly, the WTO has more recently had to take cognizance of dissenting view-
points. For instance, in United States-German Steel CVDs, the full dissenting view of an
unnamed member of the panel was published as part of the panel's report. 00 Notably, the
dissenting opinion criticizes the rest of the panel for imposing on Members obligations that
are not apparent from the text of the WTO Agreements. That case concerned whether or
202. DSU, supra note 13, art. 14(1), (3).
203. Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent, 83 GEo.
L.J. 2069, 2069 (1995) (noting that the publication of dissents serves a number of significant purposes).
204. Neal Kumar Katyal,Judges asAdviegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1805 n.449 (1998) (citing numerous,
significant cases in U.S. jurisprudence where the dissenting opinion was ultimately adopted as the law).
205. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429-49 (1793).
206. Katyal, supra note 204. In fact, Justice Iredell's opinion opens the decision, being written in the days
when Justices still wrote individual opinions, instead of writing an "opinion of the Court."
207. 163 U.S. 537,.552 (1896).
208. Report of the Panel, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Germany, 9J'f 10.1-10.15, WT/DS213/R (July 3, 2002), available at 2002 XVTO DS LEXIS 29
[hereinafter Panel Report on Steel Products from Germany]. Members of the panel were Messrs. Hugh
McPhail, Ronald Erdmann, and XVieslaw Karsz.
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not Members were obliged to extend the countervailing duty de minimis standard applicable
to CVD investigations to five-year sunset reviews conducted by the national investigating
authorities. The entire panel agreed that, "nothing in the text of Article 21.3 specifically
provides that the de minimis standard applicable to investigations is also applicable to sunset
reviews." 09 The EC argued, however, that the context of article 21.3 of the SCM Agree-
ment, in light of article 11.9, required that the two proceedings be adjudicated consis-
tently.210 The majority of the panel agreed with the EC and held that sunset reviews should
be conducted according to the same de minimis standard as CVD investigations, reasoning
that "such silence in the relevant provision as to the applicability of a de minimis standard
to sunset reviews is not dispositive given an examination of the text of Article 21.3 in its
context and in light of the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement."2 I
The dissenting view took a much less expansive, and more correct, approach to the source
of international legal obligations:
The context of a legal provision-that is, other paragraphs of the provision or related provisions
elsewhere in the text-does not in and of itself create a legal obligation. The legal obligation
must be found first and foremost in the text of the provision. Otherwise, one would be forced
to accept the view that consistency reasons may constitute sufficient grounds for the so-called
"implication" of obligations.
While I do not disagree that application of the same de minimis standard to sunset reviews
as to investigations would ensure a certain balance between the disciplines applicable to in-
vestigations and those applicable to sunset reviews, it is difficult to conclude on that basis alone
that the same de minimis standard applies to both instances. Policy arguments alone are not
sufficient for me to find that this is the case; rather, I would have to find that there is a proper
legal basis for the European Communities' position, interpreting Article 21.3 pursuant to the
customary rules of treaty interpretation. While it would not be illogical-and it would reflect
a degree of consistency in the treatment of investigations and sunset reviews-to apply the
same de minimis standard to sunset reviews as to investigations, I cannot conclude on those
grounds alone that that is the case, and I consider that the text of the SCM Agreement does
not require investigating authorities to do so. I consider that the text of Article 21.3-literally
and in its context-clearly fails to establish an obligation on investigating authorities to apply
a de minimis standard to sunset reviews. 12
It is apparent that the publication of dissent is a positive step forward and, in certain
respects, validates the dissenting viewpoint. At a minimum, the Appellate Body and future
WTO panels would have to be cognizant of this perspective.
Similarly, in EC-Poultry, the panel's report contained a brief dissenting view of one
unnamed panelist, under the heading "Opinion by a member of the Panel," concerning the
interpretation of article 5.1(b) of the Agreement of Agriculture.2" The interpretation
209. Id. 1 10.2.
210. Id. 10.8.
211. Id. 10.2.
212. Id. TJ 10.8, 10.9 (emphasis in original). In fact, the views of the dissent were effectively adopted by the
Appellate Body on appeal. See Report of the Appellate Body, U.S.-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002), available at 2002 WL
31670105 (W.T.O.).
213. Report of the Panel, European Communities-Measures Affecting the importation of Certain Poultry Products,
lj 289-292,WT/DS69/R (Mar. 12, 1998), available at 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 25. The panelists in the case
were Wilhelm Meier, Peter May, and Magda Shahin.
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advocated by the majority of the panel would limit the instances in which the EC could
impose safeguard measures on imports. The unnamed panelist was not persuaded that the
term "the price at which imports may enter the customs territory of the Member granting
the concession, as determined on the basis of the c.i.f. import price of the shipment con-
cerned expressed in terms of its domestic currency"2 1 4 means the c.i.f. price plus the duties
paid. The panelist stated:
If the drafters of this provision had intended to include customs duty, they could have referred
to the "duty paid c.i.f. import price," a notion that appeared in preliminary discussion papers of
the negotiators. The Panel's interpretation, in my opinion, is inappropriate in light of the context
of Article 5.1 (b), including its footnote 2 and Article 5.5, which unambiguously refer to "the
average c.i.f. unit value" and "the c.i.f. import price" respectively. Article 5.1 (b), footnote 2 and
Article 5.5 must be interpreted in a consistent and coherent manner in order to have a meaningful
functioning of the special safeguard provisions within the framework of tariffication process
while avoiding undue restraint on the possible recourse to those provisions.
215
Upon appeal, the Appellate Body, without explicitly stating that the dissenting view was
correct, relied on much of the same reasoning as the unnamed panelist in reversing the
panel's interpretation of article 5.1(b).
It is noteworthy that the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture chose to use as the relevant
import price the entry price into the customs territory, rather than the entry price into the domestic
market .... The ordinary meaning of these terms in Article 5.1(b) supports the view that the
"price at which that product may enter the customs territory" of the importing Member should
be construed to mean just that-the price at which the product may enter the customs territory,
not the price at which the product may enter the domestic market of the importing Member. And
that price is a price that does not include customs duties and internal charges....
We think it significant also that ordinary customs duties are not mentioned as a component
of the relevant import price in the text of Article 5.1 (b). Article 5.1 (b) does not state that the
relevant import price is "the c.i.f. price plus ordinary customs duties." Accordingly, to read the
inclusion of customs duties into the definition of the c.i.f. import price in Article 5. 1(b) would
require us to read words into the text of that provision that simply are not there.
21 6
U.S.-German Steel CVDs and EC-Poultry provide illustrative examples of the benefits
achieved by encouraging the publication of dissenting opinions. As appropriate, the WTO
must continue with this development and, indeed, begin to provide information concerning
the names of dissenters. Given the ad hoc nature of WT'O panels and the panelist selection
process, a country has a right to know if a former panelist under review for a new appoint-
ment was the author of a majority or dissenting view.
I. IMPROVING THE CLARITY OF PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY REPORTS
A variety of factors have conspired to produce \VTO reports that are long-winded and
tedious at best, and nearly incomprehensible at worst. The gradual shift from the more
diplomatic GATT dispute resolution system has engendered the current panel practice of
214. Id. 9 290.
215. Id.
216. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poul-
tny Products, '9j 59-60, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998), available at 1998 \ITO DS LEXIS 30.
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repeating every argument raised by disputants expressly, no matter how illogical or baseless
it might be." '7 When the dispute settlement process was diplomatically oriented, and the
GATT needed to worry about "offend[ing] the sensibilities of government-trade law-
yers,""' this made some sense. Today, it does not.
What has resulted are some spectacularly long, and difficult to fathom, reports. In 1990,
Robert Hudec bemoaned a 1979 panel report that required "39 printed pages in the BISD
to state the parties' arguments and counterarguments." 19 By today's standards, however,
thirty-nine pages to state the arguments would be mercifully svelte. The sheer size of panel
and Appellate Body reports is one indication of the seriousness of the problem. The average
length of panel reports has ballooned from seven pages between 1948 and 1969 to 184
pages between 1995 and 1999. Moreover, the longest decision by 1999 weighed in at an
astonishing 579 pages, :0 while up until 1980 the high mark was only thirty-nine pages.
The length of these reports alone diminishes their value to scholars and practitioners. It is
impracticable to follow the cases closely and carefully due to the amount of time necessary
for such an undertaking.
Average Length of GATT/WATO Opinions 2'
Complaints No. of Published Average Length Longest
Filed in Full Decisions of Decisions Decision
1948-1959 9 7 pp. 14 pp.
1960-1969 4 7 pp. 10 pp.
1970-1979 14 15 pp. 39 pp.
1980-1989 19 28 pp. 39 pp.
1985-1988 7 48 pp. 82 pp.
1996-2002" 102 201 pp. 719 pp.
*This reflects only the first half of 2002.
Even more serious is the fact that this drafting style often makes it difficult to determine
where discussion of the parties' views ends and the panel's decision begins."': Again, this
217. Ragosta, supra note 2, at 765.
218. Id. Professor Hudec explains this problem well:
One annoying little consequence of greater political attention that persists to this day is governments'
insistence that panel reports record absolutely everything that they have argued. A professional tribunal
would trim, reshape and restate the parties' arguments in a way that would most sharply define the
issues being decided by its ruling. GAIT panel reports, by contrast, are burdened with everything a
government has said, no matter how little sense it makes, how repetitive it is, or how much it may
confuse understanding of the panel decision. Government officials feel they must make a record for
all the interested parties back home.
Hudec, supra note 7, at 9, 13.
219. Id. at 12.
220. Report of the Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, \VT/DS44/R
(Mar. 31, 1998), available at 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 19.
221. An earlier edition of this table is provided in Hudec, supra note 7, at 11, which is relied upon up to the
WTO experience.
222. See Ragosta, supra note 2, at 767.
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situation is unacceptable given the judicial cast of the DSU, as it hampers the development
of the body of WTO law. If panel decisions have binding effect and precedential value,
then a basic step that must be taken to improve the system would be to improve the quality
of drafting so that those decisions may be studied and interpreted more effectively.223
IV. Correcting the Imbalance: A Question of Survival for
the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Whether binding dispute settlement can work in an international regime with sovereign
actors has always been a subject of great debate and concern. As VS. Mani explained: "An
international tribunal cannot afford to deal with [sovereign states] in the same way in which
a municipal tribunal does with private litigants. For, cooperation of the litigant States is an
essential prerequisite for successful adjudication of disputes. To secure their cooperation
their sovereign sensibilities have to be respected. 2.,,24
These concerns are particularly important given that international regimes, like the
WTO, are usually based upon agreements that are negotiated under heavy time constraints
and political pressures from a variety of directions. The conciliatory character of interna-
tional negotiations inevitably results in language that is deliberately vague and often con-
tradictory,225 as opposed to national legislation that places more primacy on clarity and
predictability in a relatively transparent process.
22 6
More importantly, the current system allows the DSB-through its binding interpreta-
tions of the negotiated agreements-to create legal obligations where none existed before,
and without any democratic participation by WTO Members or their constituencies. This
is wrong, in a legal (and even moral) sense, but also dangerous: what Professor Raustiala
has termed "generativity," establishes a source of centralized, unaccountable power. With-
out the necessary accountability, the undermining of international authority is a real pos-
sibility. If the WTO DSB continues to create new obligations without democratic partic-
ipation, it is only a matter of time before the cries from the streets of Seattle find their way
to London, Paris, Berlin, Tokyo, Seoul, Buenos Aires, etc. As Professor Raustiala put it,
there is a growing "sense of bait-and-switch-WTO critics argued that they thought they
were getting international trade agreements and instead discovered roving, quasi-
constitutional rules (generativity) emanating from inaccessible tribunals in Geneva (insu-
larity)."227
In short, the system is characterized by a fundamental imbalance between the credence
afforded WTO DSB decisions, and the relative lack of legitimacy of the decision-making
process. WTO decisions are routinely touted by academics, lawyers, and some governments
as the "law" even though WTO dispute settlement clearly does not live up to the democratic
223. The recently issued panel report in United States-German Steel CVDs is an encouraging example of a
relatively concise (albeit flawed) decision that totaled approximately fifty pages.
224. Quoted in Gaffnev, supra note 25, at 1184.
225. See Ragosta, supra note 2, at 740.
226. The system as it exists now undermines the central goals of the XVTO system. By breeding uncertainty
among WTO members about whether negotiated concessions will be upheld in later panel and Appellate Body
reports, it creates unwillingness to enter into more expansive agreements. Yet, the careful and comfortable
accretion of increasingly broad and clear obligations through repeated rounds, not judicial declarations, is the
means by which the international trade regime grew so rapidly and effectively in the post-war era.
227. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 415.
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requirements of a "law-making" body, in terms of both its institutional structure and rules
of procedure.
One way or the other, the imbalance must be corrected. Either the WTO must undergo
the necessary institutional and procedural reforms to justify Members' acceptance of WTO
decision-making, or the binding nature of DSB decisions must be altered to more appro-
priately reflect the true nature of the DSB as a non-judicial body. Whatever its merits, or
lack thereof, the former appears to be out of reach for at least the foreseeable future.
Changes necessary to elevate the WTO DSB to a legitimate "world court" would entail
reforms that border on the notion of a one-world government,for example, direct or indirect
participation of the citizenry, an effective legislative function, accountability (by election or
otherwise) of the selection of decision-makers, regulation of lobbying activities, etc.
The second alternative-a shift towards recognition of the political nature of W'TO
dispute settlement-is much more plausible and much less revolutionary. The simplest and
surest method to rectify the imbalance would appear to be a move toward a consensus-
based Dispute Settlement (DS) system.2 Put simply, this would be GATT dispute settle-
ment "plus," with the new codes. Two key observations must be made: First, the ability to
use codes and procedures that are far more developed than the Tokyo Round codes would
itself dramatically improve old-style GATT dispute settlement.229 Second, contrary to the
convenient myth of a failed GATT dispute settlement system, the system really operated
quite well. In almost all cases, it functioned as designed and aggrieved parties obtained
vindication of their rights. 2" ° When it did not, it was often because the nature of the dispute,
given the international reality, was simply not subject to appropriate resolution by dispute
settlement panels at the time, for example, EC agricultural subsidies and DISC. (Notice,
for example, that the provision in the Agricultural Agreement on subsidies would, in part,
provide a basis for more effective dispute settlement.) An improvement from this very
successful system would prove to be very effective dispute settlement.
Under the prior GAT regime, the threat of blocking could prove to be an aid, rather
than an impediment, to the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system.23" ' WTO panels
subject to similar constraints would be much more careful to consider the implications of
their decisions.23 Such restraint by the DSU would, itself, make the prospect of blocking
even less likely. This type of system would conform to the norms of international law already
discussed: parties would be held only to those obligations to which they specifically agree.
And the WTO membership would have a way to constrain panels, keeping them from
imposing new obligations. Moreover, with better procedures for decision-making, and
clearer rules than prior to GATT 1994, the success of the institution would likely continue
to improve.
228. Claude Barfield correctly notes that "a move toward a more 'diplomatic' approach to dispute settlement,
one that would complement the legal system and provide a safety valve, is essential for the survival of the WTO
as a viable institution." BARFIELD, supra note 15, at 112.
229. See Hudec, supra note 7, at 16, 23.
230. Hudec notes that the GATT was actually fairly successful at resolving disputes despite its perceived
problems. Id. at 16-17, 19; see also William J. Davey, The World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement System,
42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (2001) (noting about GATT dispute settlement that "eighty to ninety percent
of complainants that were legitimate had their complaint totally or partially resolved in the system.").
231. As Raj Bhala notes, the older GATT system, which allowed for blocking by just one Member, was a
system where Members "threw [their] weight behind" adopted panel reports. Bhala, supra note 1, at 869.
232. After all, were there no Congressional oversight of the judiciary, would we not be able to expect that
judicial decisions would deviate even further from statutory norms?
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An alternative approach would be to permit a blocking potential but not blocking simply
by any single Member. For example, if some specified percentage of WTO Members (by
number or share of trade) voted to block a panel report, the report would not be adopted.
This would force panels and the Appellate Body to consider the actual ramifications of
expansive decisions that reflected substantive changes to the agreements negotiated by the
Members. This approach has been proposed by others, including Claude Barfield. "
A third proposal which has been suggested, and could be implemented with or without
other reforms, is to move cases that are particularly politically divisive because of their
magnitude (e.g., FSC) or their sensitivity (e.g., Beef Hormones, Shrimp-Turtle) out of the
DSB's jurisdiction . 3 4 This would simply be a means of preventing the panels from con-
structing obligations in cases where it is clear that the litigating parties do not have the
same understanding of the agreed-upon obligations. While some might see such a move as
a failure of the DSU, it would in actuality be an improvement for all the reasons why
constructing binding agreements in such cases is bad in the first place. It is far better to
leave some cases, particularly those that most starkly pit a Member's WTO obligations
against truly immovable forces, undecided than to undermine the entire system by the
perception that the DSU has the power to impose obligations where none existed through
the agreements themselves. In effect, this is exactly what happened with respect to the EC's
threatened challenge of the Helms-Burton law. The problem with this approach is who is
to decide that a case is too divisive for the WTO, and when it would be decided? Would
such a right end up being effectively exercised only by the United States, the EC, and
Japan?
A fourth and more plausible approach would entail a hybrid scheme that would continue
to build upon the progress that has been made while also addressing the fundamental flaws
that have arisen in the DSU and the DSB. Under this proposal, Parties would not be able
formally to prevent the formation of a panel but, prior to creation of a panel, a party to the
dispute could specify whether the ensuing dispute settlement should proceed upon a legal
model, with a binding, enforceable adjudicated result, or a diplomatic model the results of
which could ultimately be blocked.
Some will say that, under this hybrid scheme, most cases would inevitably proceed on
the second track, the old GATF model. This is not necessarily the case. For example, while
cases that are either too politically sensitive because they reflect differences in fundamental
values (e.g., Beef Hormones, Shrimp-Turtle), or are too far-reaching (e.g., FSC), might not
proceed on a binding, litigation track, the majority of tariff disputes, for example, those
which involve the highly technical issues for which enforceable litigation is the appropriate
avenue, would proceed within a binding adjudicatory framework. Indeed Parties might
prove reticent to invoke such protection. In any event, with improved codes and procedural
protections, the results of old GA-F-style dispute settlement would be even more effective
and robust than the very successful, but much maligned, GA-IT dispute settlement. As for
controversial trade remedy cases, parties would insist upon non-binding processes until the
233. BARFIELD, supra note 15, at 127 (proposing that if at least one-third of DSB members, representing at
least one-quarter of total trade among XWFO members, express disagreement with a panel or AB decision, then
that decision should be blocked). Robert Hudec expressed a similar idea in devising a system to replace the
original panel report adoption procedures of the GATT, which required a consensus of all members. Hudec,
saupra note 7, at 3 1.
234. Wolff & Ragosta, supra note 4, at 704-05.
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panels demonstrated an appropriate appreciation of the standard of review and, over time,
as rules are more clearly developed, binding dispute settlement would likely become the
norm.
The hybrid approach has several advantages. First, it retains the flexibility to adapt a
binding litigation or diplomatic model to particular trade disputes as the parties deem
appropriate. Second, while remaining within the overall framework of WVTO dispute set-
tlement, it provides a check against the ability of panels to overstep their bounds. If parties
view "ATO panels as exceeding their mandates and thus have less confidence in the dispute
settlement system, VFFO panel decisions will be accorded less weight in the future. And
third, and perhaps most importantly, it permits something of a "release valve" to alleviate
the pressure placed on the DSB as a whole brought about by "controversial" cases. Members
might be wise to sacrifice the highly acclaimed achievement of fully binding dispute settle-
ment in all cases for the sake of preserving WVTO dispute settlement as a viable institution.
With respect to procedural defects, the need for reform is clearer (albeit not simple).
Barring substantive changes in the nature of the DSB-that is, if the DSB in whatever form
is to continue to serve the international community as a binding forum for resolving trade
disputes-then there needs to be concrete procedural rights and protections afforded to
parties in interest. The most basic of these rights implicate better access to the system. The
DSU could allow for private causes of action, private counsel participation in or at least
observation of panel and Appellate Body proceedings, and amicus briefs. All of these changes
would allow more input into the decision-making process, which is essential if the WATO
is to maintain its "judicial" character. This would increase worldwide support for expansive
trade agreements because it would assure governments and private actors that they would
be able to submit (and the panels will be forced to consider) the best information and legal
arguments available should a dispute arise. On a more fundamental "justice" level, this
would give private parties affected by the WTO agreements the assurance that they will be
able to defend their interests in the "court" of the DSU.
Another critical avenue for reform lies in changing jurisdictional requirements. The pri-
mary way this could be done would be to institute clear rules on standing, mootness, and
ripeness. These sorts of rules would force panels and the Appellate Body to consider dis-
putes about the agreements only in the context of cases that have legitimate international
trade effects, that is, cases that affect the movement of goods and services across national
boundaries. It would preclude advisory opinions and force parties alleging that a domestic
law is not in conformity with the W4TO agreements to show actual injury. As previously
discussed, this would improve the quality of the opinions.
Another essential reform is to allow the Appellate Body to remand cases. This would be
another means of controlling panels that have decided to construct agreements inappro-
priately and create obligations. It is a way for the Appellate Body to tell a panel that it in
effect got it wrong, and needs to make a decision that conforms to the agreements and the
law.
Lastly, the Appellate Body should be given authority to consider serious factual as well
as legal error. This is another means of control over inappropriate panel decisions. With
proper Appellate Body oversight, this type of control could eliminate, for example, the
disregarding of national investigating authority determinations that has already occurred
in AD/CVD cases. At the same time, concern over expanding the Appellate Body's role to
the point of making the panels irrelevant can be addressed through an appropriate standard
FALL 2003
748 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
of review for appeals.3 5 Of course, all of this assumes that the Appellate Body itself ceases
to overstep its bounds.
V. Consequences of Inaction: Is the WTO Headed for a Showdown?
Of course, this all begs the question; what if reform is not made? What if panels and the
Appellate Body continue to ignore the expertise of agencies? What if WTO decisions
continue the near-universal pattern of wholesale rejection of unfair trade remedies and
safeguards? What if the DSB continues to create obligations where none were agreed upon
through its divine "Platonic guardianship" of its own views of free trade?
If real reforms are not made, the United States should announce that it would initiate a
political process to review its participation in the V[O itself.116 The VWTO Dispute Settle-
ment Review Commission, endorsed by President Clinton and Congressional leaders,1
7
could have effectively done so, but there is no reason that such concerns should be ignored
even without a "commission." Moreover, proposals for such a commission have resurfaced. 38
Of course, this is not to say that the United States would withdraw. It is possible that the
very consideration by the United States of this step would finally induce serious negotiations
and consideration of the WTO DSU shortcomings. If not, the United States must seriously
consider both as a substantive matter, and as a matter of sovereignty, whether it can support
trade Platonic Guardians writing law in closed hearings in Geneva.
The United States has chosen this tactic, with some success, in other fora; for instance,
the much publicized debate concerning U.S. participation in the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Concerned with the dilution of U.S. sovereignty over dispensation of criminal
justice to its nationals, especially soldiers, the United States has refused to recognize the
jurisdiction of the court, although its lawyers had been instrumental in drafting its statute
(a situation similar to the WTO). To prevent its peacekeepers serving in United Nations
missions abroad from being hauled into The Hague to stand trial, the United States de-
manded immunity for its soldiers serving in UN-authorized operations.2' 9 Its request was
rejected with near unanimity by fellow members of the UN Security Council and other
nations.240 Protecting U.S. interests in this case required playing "hard ball." Facing op-
position in the UN Security Council from nations supporting the ICC, the United States
threatened to withdraw its troops and vital logistical support from all UN missions and
vetoed, "with great regret," the renewal of a UN mandate for the Bosnia peacekeepers.24
Although the United States was vilified, as is the usual custom, over its unilateralism,242 a
235. For more on these topics, see Ragosta, supra note 2, at 765.
236. In fact, this process may have already begun. In passing TPA legislation, the U.S. Congress insisted
upon a provision that "requires the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report to Congress outlining a strategy
for correcting instances in which dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body have added to obligations
or diminished rights of the United States." See Finance Committee Report, supra note 68, at 8.
237. Trade Policy Reform Act, H.R. 2612, 106th Cong. §§ 4101-4106 (1999).
238. Baucus, supra note 28.
239. Barnaby Mason, Washington seeks troop immunity, BBC NEws, WORLD EDITioN, June 20, 2002, at
htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/2056005.sin.
240. Id.
241. UN Seeks to Break Bosnia Impasse, BBC NEsS, WORLD EDITIONJune 28, 2002,athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/world/americas/2069059.stn; NATO Discusses U.S. Bosnia Threat, BBC NEws, WORLD EDITION, July 1,
2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/2078229.stm.
242. US criticised in UN debate, BBC NEws, VORLD EDITION, July 11, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
world/americas/2121520.stm.
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compromise was reached where the United States continued its participation in UN peace-
keeping, and the UN Security Council unanimously voted to exempt all U.S. peacekeepers
from ICC prosecution for a year, while negotiations would continue.143 Indeed, the manner
in which the United States has stood at odds with jurisdiction of the ICC, some would say
in an almost cavalier attitude, is all the more remarkable given U.S. acquiescence in WTO
judicial activism.
The point is not to justify or criticize the U.S. position on the ICC; that is a complex
matter far beyond the purview of this article. The point is that in a very parallel situation,
the ICC case makes it clear that the international community is far more likely to pay
attention to U.S. concerns about potential international judicial activism when it becomes
clear to some nations that they stand to lose something. Similarly, WTO Members agreed
to seriously consider GATT dispute resolution reform only after the United States enacted
"Super 301" in 1988.144 A public statement that the United States is reviewing its partici-
pation in the unreformed ITO would send a similar message and has a higher chance of
bringing about reform.
Of course, it is highly unlikely that the United States would ever be forced to withdraw.
Yet, what if it did? Contrary to the blind screams of outrage and prophecies of doom, this
would hardly collapse the world trading system. First, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) would continue, as would NAFTA and other regional or bilateral arrangements.
Second, as the United States represents the largest consumer market in the world, it would
be foolish for its trading partners to refuse to give it Most Favored Nation (MFN) status.
One could quickly return to a GATT system. Third, over the very short-term, one could
imagine negotiation of a GATF "plus" regime such as that advocated herein to bring the
United States back into the fold.
More likely is the possibility that, without a change in Geneva, the United States will
start to view WTO dispute settlement as largely irrelevant in practical terms, and refuse to
acknowledge that its decisions carry any legitimacy. Rumblings by U.S. lawmakers and
commentators in this vein have already commenced:
* The then-chairman of the Senate Finance Committee-the leading U.S. lawmaker re-
sponsible for trade matters-publicly touted WATO dispute settlement as nothing more
than a "kangaroo court."
2 5
* The U.S. Congress recently warned the Administration of the necessity of addressing
dispute settlement in ongoing negotiations, expressing:
the view that continued support for trade expansion requires a preservation of the balance of
rights and obligations negotiated in trade agreements. It identifies a growing concern that this
balance may be upset by decisions of dispute settlement panels convened in the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") and the WTO Appellate Body. This concern is prompted by recent
decisions placing new obligations on the United States,... which are not found anywhere in
the negotiated texts of the relevant WTO agreements.
Congress finds that WTO panels and the Appellate Body have ignored their obligation to
243. Dispute over war crimes court settled, BBC NEws, WORLD EDITION, July 13, 2002, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/2125829.stm.
244. Hudec, supra note 10, at 14.
245. Baucus, supra note 28.
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afford an appropriate level of deference to the technical expertise, factual findings, and per-
missible legal interpretations of national investigating authorities...
2 46
" A conservative think tank published an important volume criticizing the process as
wrongly compromising countries' sovereignty.
47
" Academics increasingly note the institutional and practical problems with the system.1
48
None of these criticisms were seriously imaginable a few short years ago.1
49
In any event, the possibility of U.S. withdrawal, or other significant action, should be met
with neither unbridled horror, nor dismissed as impossible. The United States might ulti-
mately have no choice but to withdraw, given the ever growing cost of its WTO commit-
ments, the refusal of the DSB to constrain its judicial activism, and the lack of any effective
democratic oversight of such activism. During the drafting of this article, the WTO author-
ized the European Community to retaliate against more than $4 billion in U.S. exports as
part of the FSC case,2 50 a case the EC had previously agreed not to initiate in the first place.
When the cost of a single decision, one that should have never been issued, goes into a ten-
digit dollar figure, no credible diplomatic options should remain off the table.
VI. Conclusion
The early work of the Dispute Settlement Body, as Professor Bhala notes, was accom-
panied by a "near irrational exuberance. '"25' The system was lauded by many in the begin-
ning as a "'world court' for trade.1 252 In fact, in those heady days, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative's office was fond of talking glowingly of the U.S. win/loss record, 23 although even
then there was a tendency to treat minor technical victories on small cases as the equivalent
of a major commercial loss. Even today, U.S. officials claim relative parity in results,254
ignoring the clear trend and commercial imbalance in wins and losses. More fundamentally,
if the WTO DSB is to be seen as a court, its success cannot simply be measured by a win/
loss scorecard. We have a right, indeed an obligation, to expect appropriate judicial behavior
in all cases.
Much has changed though. Not only have panels almost universally been deciding against
the United States for several years (something that many, including many in the U.S. bar,
would welcome in the abstract), but the bases for the decisions are at best dubious and,
when the appropriate standard of review and international legal doctrines are considered,
are wholly untenable. WTO panels are "making law" as if they were Platonic Guardians
246. Finance Committee Report, supra note 68, at 6.
247. BARFIELD, supra note 15.
248. See Bhala, supra note 1; Raustiala, supra note 5; Tarullo, supra note 9.
249. A few analysts did note early on the dangers inherent to a dispute settlement system that lacked adequate
democratic and procedural protections. See, e.g., Volff & Ragosta, supra note 4, at 705-08.
250. Patrick Bartlett, EU scores in US trade battle, BBC NEWS, WORLD EDITION, Aug. 30, 2002, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2225972.stm.
251. Bhala, supra note 1, at 856.
252. See Ragosta, supra note 2.
253. See 1998 Trade Policy Agenda and 1997 Annual Report, United States Trade Representative, at 56-69.
Interestingly in the introduction to the section addressing the disputes brought by the United States, the report
terms the WTO dispute settlement "an effective tool in combating barriers to U.S. exports." Id. at 56. However,
in the introduction to the section on the cases brought against the United States, the USTR makes no com-
parable comment.
254. See Jeffrey Sparshott, U.S. Setbacks Before 170 Spur Scrutiny, WASH. TImEs, Nov. 14, 2002.
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of trade sitting in secret in Geneva. Nowhere is this clearer than in the area of trade
remedies.
But another change has occurred, and it is one that may ultimately be even more im-
portant. This is that the WTO dispute settlement system is no longer immune from
criticism.
As noted above, while different people identify different aspects of the problem, the
fundamental issue seems to be an imbalance in the WTO's "judicial" powers and its "leg-
islative" and "executive" function. If one wanted and were able to obtain one world gov-
ernment (functioning in an appropriate and democratic manner), there would hardly be a
basis to object to a binding judicial system. As the world is, however (and as most govern-
ments appear to want to keep it that way for the foreseeable future), there is an enormous
problem in having a powerful "judicial" function, unclear or ambiguous substantive pro-
visions, lack of effective procedural protections, etc. The inevitable result-a result that has
occurred-is judicial activism.
Unfortunately for the United States (and the millions of Americans who rely on the
effective operation of rules against unfair trade), these judicial activists have decided in their
wisdom, and contrary to the negotiated texts, that trade remedies expressly provided for in
the agreements should be gutted. Environmental and labor activists are not entirely wrong
when they bemoan the fact that it may be environmental and labor rights that suffer in
future decisions-at least there is no way to ensure otherwise given the current system.
The question is, of course, what is to be done about it? In that regard, there are several
possibilities. First, the system could simply muddle through. Panelists will continue to
rewrite (or "interpret" actively) the current agreements. Trade laws will continue to be
impaired. Subsidies and dumping will be protected (rather than those suffering from such
practices). The United States, with the world's most open market, will suffer economically
(although given the size of its economy, many of the bureaucrats in Washington will be
able to ignore it). The Platonic Guardians will win, and the Court of International Trade
judges and U.S. trade bar can cease their unnecessary function.
Alternatively, the United States could insist upon changes to bring into balance the
WTO's various government functions. This would demand that WTO dispute settlement
be fundamentally reformulated. First, as previously discussed, countries must have some
ability to block implementation of panel decisions that are fundamentally inconsistent with
important provisions. Second, clear restrictions on panels' judicial activism-for example,
a strict standard of review and jurisdictional limitations-need to be provided. Third, pro-
cedural reforms such as protecting real parties in interest are essential. If these cannot be
achieved, the United States should seriously reconsider its role in the WTO (including
funding and participation).
Finally, even if nothing is done to correct the imbalance in the XVTO dispute settlement
system, at a minimum, a body that has "judicial" power should have judicial procedures.
The W'TO suffers from a surfeit of moot and irrelevant cases. The VeTO suffers from
issues of legitimacy that accompany a lack of transparency. The interested parties suffer
from a lack of effective rules and procedures. Whatever else is done, these problems should
be addressed. The USTR's efforts to create a more transparent system are only the begin-
ning of that process.
Of course, there are other possibilities. Perhaps panels will start to obey their obligation
to refrain from creating new international legal requirements. Perhaps panels will remem-
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ber that sovereigns cannot be prevented from taking action unless they have specifically
agreed not to take action. Perhaps panels will learn to refrain from making decisions when
the rules simply do not bear a particular mandate. One must suspect not, however. Without
a real threat of a major reformation, one suspects that being a secret Platonic Guardian is
enjoyable. Perhaps another result awaits: The VTO dispute settlement will become in-
creasingly irrelevant. That, too, would be unfortunate.
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